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Abstract: 
 
Accurate numbers are needed to understand and predict viral dynamics. Curation of high-quality 
literature values for the infectious period duration or household secondary attack rate, for 
example, is especially pressing right now because these numbers inform decisions about how and 
when to lockdown or reopen societies. We aim to provide a curated source for the key numbers 
that help us understand the virus driving our current global crisis. This compendium focuses 
solely on COVID-19 epidemiology. The numbers reported in summary format are substantiated by 
annotated references. For each property, we provide a concise definition, description of 
measurement and inference methods and associated caveats. We hope this compendium will 
make essential numbers more accessible and avoid common sources of confusion for the many 
newcomers to the field such as using the incubation period to denote and quantify the latent 
period or using the hospitalization duration for the infectiousness period duration. This document 
will be repeatedly updated and the community is invited to participate in improving it.  
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Figure 1: Key epidemiological properties of COVID-19 and their values.​ Further details are 
provided in the following dedicated subsections. 
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Latent period duration 
 
Definition​: time between infection and the onset of infectiousness, a distribution among cases.  
 
Best estimate​: ​3-4 days 
 
Methods of estimation​: To calculate the latent period, we would ideally like to know the timing of 
infection and the time-dependent infectiousness profile for a large number of people. Individual 
profiles could then be combined to calculate an infectiousness profile (infectiousness as a function 
of time since infection) for COVID-19. The infectiousness profile is a continuous distribution, so the 
latent period can then be defined as the time interval that must pass before half-maximal 
infectiousness. The two main methods of estimating the duration of the latent and infectiousness 
periods durations are i) use of known infector-infectee pairs, and ii) fitting epidemiological 
compartmental models.  
 
Estimates​: 
● Epidemiological models (for early stages in China):  
○ (Li et al. 2020)​ - ​”In addition, the median estimates for the latent and infectious periods 
are approximately ​3.69​ and 3.48 days, respectively.​”  Table S1 “​Latency period (Z, days) 
(95% CIs) (3.48, 3.90)​” 
○ (Tian et al. 2020)​ - Table 3. The table reports ​4.9 ​days long incubation period ​(​4.32 to 
5.47 95% CI), but the intention is 4.9 days long latent period 
● Infector-Infectee pairs (77 from China): ​(He et al. 2020)​ - Figure 1C reports the infectiousness 
profile as a function of days from symptom onset. We use the time it takes the infectiousness 
to reach half its peak, which happens two days before symptom onset. As symptoms arise 
after 5 days (see incubation period), this means the latent period is about ​3 ​days. 
 
See further insights and analysis in a dedicated ​section​. 
 
Caveats​: 
● Epidemiological models usually use the dynamics of the epidemic to infer a population-level 
characteristic (e.g. median or mean). The structure of the model inherently determines the 
distribution of the latent period. For example, in the standard SEIR model, the latent period is 
assumed to be exponentially distributed. 
● Simple SEIR-type models assume infectiousness onset occurs at a specific time, before which 
a person is not infectious and after which it becomes fully infectious. A more realistic 
scenario is that infectiousness increases gradually throughout the progression of the 
infection, and thus the definition of the latent period is harder to discern. We use the time until 
half-maximal infectiousness as the definition for the latent period in infector-infectee pair data 
● There is often confusion in the literature between the latent period and the incubation period, 
the latent period being the time before the onset of infectiousness and the incubation period 
being the time before onset of symptoms. Many manuscripts refer to the properties of the 
latent period but write it as the incubation period or use the value of the incubation period to 
describe the latent period. 
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Infectious period duration 
 
Definition​: characteristic duration at which a person is infectious 
 
Best estimate​: ​4-5 days 
 
Methods of estimation​: The two main methods for estimating the duration of infectiousness is to use 
infector-infectee pairs, and the use of epidemiological compartmental models. When using 
infector-infectee pairs, it is difficult to determine the exact time of infection. Instead, patient-reported 
timing of symptom onset is used to determine the lag between infector symptoms and infectee 
symptoms, also known as the serial interval (see also relevant section). This data is combined with 
independent data on the distribution of incubation periods (the time from infection to symptom 
onset), and a distribution of generation intervals (time from infection of the infector to the infection of 
the infectee) is inferred. The distribution of the generation intervals is also commonly used as a 
measure of the infectiousness profile of infected individuals. The difference between the generation 
interval distribution and the infectiousness profile is that the first represents a distribution of the 
probability of a secondary infection after a given time interval since the first infection, while the other 
represents a distribution of those transmission rates. Therefore, the integral of the generation interval 
distribution is by definition equal to one, while the integral of the infectiousness profile is the 
reproduction number R​t​. Thus, to convert the distribution of the generation intervals into an 
infectiousness profile, it is scaled by the average reproduction number ​(Ferretti et al. 2020)​. As this is 
a continuous distribution, there isn’t a single “infectious period” value, but one can define the interval 
between half the maximal infectiousness as a measure indicative of the infectious period duration. 
Alternatively, the infectious period can be inferred by fitting epidemiological compartmental models 
as these models relate the (unknown) infectious period to reported counts of cases and deaths.  
 
Estimates​: 
 
● Infector-Infectee pairs  
○ (77 pairs from China): ​(He et al. 2020)​ - Figure 1C reports the infectiousness profile as 
a function of days from symptom onset. We quantify the interval between the time 
points of half the maximal infectiousness based on the infectiousness profile, which is 
about ​4 days​. 
○ (44 pairs from various countries): ​(Ferreti et al. 2020)​ - “​The distribution is best 
described by a Weibull distribution (AIC=148.4, versus 149.9 for gamma and 152.3 for 
lognormal distribution) with mean and median equal to ​5.0 days ​and standard deviation 
of 1.9 days​”. The infectiousness profile has the same distribution as the generation 
time distribution. 
● Epidemiological compartmental models (for early stages of the epidemic in China):  
○ (Li et al. 2020)​ - ”​In addition, the median estimates for the latent and infectious periods 
are approximately 3.69 and ​3.48 days​, respectively.​” Table S1 “​Infectious period for 
documented infections (Dr , days)  (95% CIs) (3.26, 3.67) ​” 
○ (Tian et al. 2020)​ - Table 3. The table reports ​5.1 days ​long infectious period ​(​4.51 to 
5.86 95% CI) 
 
See further insights and analysis in a dedicated ​section​. 
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Caveats​: 
● Interventions will affect the duration of the infectious period. For example, isolation of 
infected individuals with symptoms limits their chances to infect non-household members. 
This reduces the overall number of infections, and shortens the time in which such infections 
happen, and hence the infectious period duration. 
● Epidemiological compartmental models usually use the dynamics of the epidemic to infer the 
population-level characteristic (e.g. median or mean). The structure of the model inherently 
determines the distribution shape for the infectious period. For example, in the simple 
Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) model, the distribution of the infectious 
period is assumed to be exponential. 
● Simple SEIR-type models assume infectiousness is constant throughout the infectious period, 
and that the start and end of infectiousness occurs abruptly. A more realistic scenario is that 
infectiousness increases gradually throughout the progression of the infection and then 
decreases. In this scenario, the definition of the infectious period is harder to define. We use 
the duration in which a person has infectiousness higher than half of the maximal 
infectiousness as the definition for inference of the infectiousness period from 
infector-infectee pairs data. 
● One should be careful not to confuse the infectious period duration with the time from 
infection until someone can be infected. There is a latent period duration that adds to the 
infectious period and together these two distributions determine the time from being infected 
until infecting others. In addition, there is also wide variation among cases in their 
infectiousness profile, so the infectious period duration should be used as a statistical value 
rather than a maximal cap.  
● Another source of confusion is usage of the duration of illness or hospitalization as the 
duration of infectious period. The infectious period is much shorter than the overall duration 
of illness (on the order of a few weeks). People's illness is usually prolonged due to the 
inflammatory response of the immune system. Thus people usually stop being strongly 
contagious well before they recover from the disease. The dynamics of the epidemic is 
governed by the infectious period and not by the time of overall illness duration.    
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Incubation period duration 
 
Definition​: time from infection until onset of symptoms in symptomatic cases 
 
Best estimate​: ​5 days 
 
Methods of estimation​: There are two main methods for estimating the incubation period of 
COVID-19. The first is based on investigation of possible exposure times for reported cases. This 
usually entails collecting information on possible exposure time for a set of cases, and combining 
this information with records of the onset of symptoms. A statistical model is used to fit the data with 
a possible distribution of incubation times. The second method is based on epidemiological models. 
In this approach exponential growth is used to model the dynamics of the epidemic, and a certain 
functional form is assumed for the distribution of the incubation period. The observed number of 
cases is a combined result of viral transmission (the output of the exponential growth model), and the 
distribution of incubation period (causing an infected person to show symptoms and thus be 
detected as a case). The model parameters, both for the exponential growth model, (similar to those 
described in the effective reproduction number section) as well as for the incubation period, are 
inferred such that the model’s projections match case data as closely as possible. 
 
Estimates​: 
● Investigation of the possible time for reported cases  
○ 181 cases outside Hubei: ​(Lauer et al. 2020)​ - “​The median incubation period was 
estimated to be ​5.1 days ​(95% CI, 4.5 to 5.8 days), and 97.5% of those who develop 
symptoms will do so within 11.5 days (CI, 8.2 to 15.6 days) of infection. These estimates 
imply that, under conservative assumptions, 101 out of every 10 000 cases (99th 
percentile, 482) will develop symptoms after 14 days of active monitoring or 
quarantine.​” 
○ 10 cases in Wuhan: ​(Li et al. 2020)​ - “​The mean incubation period was ​5.2 days​ (95% 
confidence interval [CI], 4.1 to 7.0), with the 95th percentile of the distribution at 12.5 
days​”. 
○ 88 cases of travellers from Wuhan ​(Backer et al. 2020)​ - “​The Weibull distribution 
provided the best fit to the data (​Table 1​). The mean incubation period was estimated to 
be ​6.4 days​ (95% credible interval (CI): 5.6–7.7).​” 
○ 158 residents from and outside Wuhan ​(Linton et al. 2020)​ - “​The mean incubation 
period was estimated at ​5.0 days ​(95% credible interval [CI]: 4.2, 6.0) when excluding 
Wuhan residents (n = 52) and ​5.6 days ​(95% CI: 5.0, 6.3) when including Wuhan 
residents (n = 158).​” 
○ 22 patients from South Korea ​(Ki et al. 2020)​ - “​The average incubation period was ​3.9 
days​ (median, 3.0)​” 
○ 50 global cases ​(Jiang et al. 2020)​ - “​The corresponding mean and 95% CI were: 
SARS‐CoV‐2, ​4.9 (4.4‐5.5) days​” 
○ 291 cases in China ​(Guan et al. 2020)​ - “​The median incubation period was ​4 days 
(interquartile range, 2 to 7)​” 
○ 49 cases from China ​(Zhang et al. 2020)​ - “​We analyzed the time interval from exposure 
to illness onset for 49 cases (with no travel history to/from Wuhan/Hubei ) identified by 
prospective contact tracing in 37 clusters. We estimated a mean incubation period of 
5.2 days ​(95%CI: 1.8-12.4), with the 95th percentile of the distribution at 10.5 days​” 
○ 93 cases from Guizhou, China ​(Ping et al. 2020)​ - “​The median incubation period was 
8.06 days ​(95% confidence interval [CI]: 6.89 – 9.36).​” 
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○ 91 cases from  Zhejiang, China ​(Qian et al. 2020)​ - “​The median of incubation period 
was ​6 (IQR, 3-8) days​” 
○ 262 cases from Beijing, China ​(Tian et al. 2020)​ - “​The median time from contact 
symptomatic case to illness onset, which is called the incubation period, was ​6.7 days​”  
○ 22 paired cases from Taiwan and mainland China ​(Cheng et al. 2020)​ - ​“​Using the data 
on the 22 paired cases, we estimated that the median incubation period was ​4.1 days 
(95% credible interval [CrI], 0.4-15.8)​” 
● Epidemiological models (for early stages in China): ​(Li et al. 2020)​ - “​The mean incubation 
period was ​5.2 days ​(95% confidence interval [CI], 4.1 to 7.0), with the 95th percentile of the 
distribution at 12.5 days.​” 
 
Caveats: 
● There is often confusion in the literature between the latent period and the incubation period, 
the latent period being the time before the onset of infectiousness and the incubation period 
being the time before onset of symptoms. Many manuscripts refer to the properties of the 
latent period but write it as the incubation period or use the value of the incubation period to 
describe the latent period. 
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Serial interval / Generation interval 
 
Definition 
 
Generation interval = average time between infection events in an infector-infectee pair. 
Serial interval =  average time between symptom onsets in an infector-infectee pair. 
See Figure 1 for a graphical representation.  
 
The serial interval distribution is a combination of the generation interval distribution with the 
incubation period distribution. The expected values of the serial and generation interval distributions 
are expected to be equal but their variances are different. The variance of the serial interval equals 
the sum of variances of the generation interval and the incubation period, and thus is larger. The 
generation interval is more useful for describing viral spread because it directly relates to the timing 
of infection, but this distribution is harder to estimate than the distribution of serial intervals because 
people do not typically know when they were infected. 
 
Interventions such as isolation of symptomatic patients and contact tracing could shorten these two 
intervals by ​replacing lower frequency and shorter duration contact (e.g. at work and social 
gatherings) with high-frequency and long duration contact at home​. The interventions lower the mean 
and median serial interval by censoring the distribution of serial intervals (among the various 
infected-infectee  couples). 
 
Best estimate​:  
No interventions​: 7 days 
Isolation of symptomatic patients and contact tracing: ​4-5 days 
 
Methods of estimation​: 
Estimation of the serial interval is based on identification and tracking of chains of transmission. 
Identifying the precise moment of infection is challenging, so most researchers use patient-reported 
timing of symptom onset, which is available in more cases. Data regarding symptom onset of 
identified pairs of infector-infectee is collected through detailed interviews. The delay between the 
onset of symptoms of each pair is sometimes used to calculate descriptive statistics (median, mean, 
standard deviation) and, in other cases, is used to fit an a priori distributional model.  
In order to estimate the generation interval from the serial interval, one must account for the 
incubation period because the infector is not infectious during this time. In some sources, symptom 
onset timing from infector-infectee pairs is combined with a reported distribution of incubation 
periods  to estimate the generation time by fitting to a parametric distribution. I​n most cases, the fit 
distributional parameters are allowed to assume a wide range of values, such that the assumptions 
have a minimal effect on the fit​. 
 
 
Estimates​: 
● Starting of the epidemic : 
○ Uncontrolled in Wuhan (china) 
■ 6 transmission pairs ​ ​(Li et al. 2020)​ ​ - “​we estimated that the ​serial interval 
distribution had a mean (±SD) of ​7.5±3.4​ days (95% CI, 5.3 to 19)​” 
■ 43 transmission pairs​ (Wu et al. 2020b)​ - “​The ​mean serial interval ​is ​7.0 
(5.8–8.1) ​days​, with a standard deviation of 4.5 (3.5–5.5) days​”. 
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○ Vo, Italy - (​Lavezzo et al. 2020​) - ​“From the inferred transmission pairs, we estimated a 
serial interval distribution with ​mean 6.90 days ​(95% CI 2.56-13.39) before lockdown 
(Figure S7) and 10.12 days (95% CI 1.67-25.90) after the lockdown” 
 
● Serial interval measured in countries that implemented isolation of symptomatic patients, 
physical distancing and contact tracing: 
○ Korea - ​(Ki et al. 2020)​ - ​“​The mean and ​median serial interval ​was estimated to be 6.6 
days (range 3-15) and​ 4.0 days​, respectively, based on data of both first-generation and 
second-generation patients”​ ​(The mean duration between symptom-onset and 
quarantine/isolation was 4.3 days) 
○ Hong Kong  
■ 21 transmission chains ​(S. Zhao, Gao, et al. 2020)​ ​-​ ​“Assuming a Gamma 
distributed model, we estimated the ​mean of SI at 4.4 days​ (95%CI: 2.9−6.7) and 
SD of SI at 3.0 days (95%CI: 1.8−5.8) by using the information of all 21 
transmission chains in Hong Kong.” 
■ 171 transmission pairs with 94 unique infectors ​(Adam et al. 2020)​ ​-​ ​“Figure 2A 
shows the empirical serial distribution between all infector-infectee pairs and 
fitted normal and lognormal distributions. The ​median serial interval was 4 days 
(IQR 3 – 8 days), and the​ mean of the fitted normal distribution was 5.6 days 
(standard deviation 4.3 days).” 
○ Singapore and Tianjin (China) - ​(Ganyani et al. 2020)​ ​- ​“The ​mean generation time​ is 
estimated to be ​5.2 days ​(95%CI, 3.78 - 6.78) for the Singapore data,  and ​3.95 days 
(95%CI, 3.01 - 4.91) for the Tianjin data”​. 
○ Shenzhen - ​48 transmission pairs ​(Bi et al. 2020)​ - ​“we estimate that the ​serial interval 
is gamma distributed with​ mean 6.3 days​ (95% CI 5.2,7.6) and a standard deviation of 
4.2 days (95% CI, 3.1,5.3)”​. 
○ Outside of Hubei province - ​468 transmission events ​(Zhanwei Du, Xiaoke Xu, et al. 
2020) ​- ​“COVID-19 ​serial intervals ​seem to resemble a normal distribution more than the 
commonly assumed gamma or Weibull distributions , which are limited to positive 
values (Appendix). We estimate a mean serial interval for COVID-19 of​ 3.96​ (95% CI 
3.53–4.39) days, with an SD of 4.75 (95% CI 4.46–5.07) days”​. 
○ Taiwan and mainland China - ​22 transmission pairs ​(Cheng et al. 2020)​ - ​“we estimated 
that the median incubation period was 4.1 days (95% credible interval [CrI], 0.4-15.8), 
and the ​median serial interval was 4.1 days (95% CrI, 0.1-27.8)​... A secondary case was 
excluded from the paired data if the beginning of exposure was after symptom onset of 
the secondary case”.​ They also separate the results between the various regions 
(medians: ​Taiwan=4.1, mainland China=5, other =2.9​) and setting (medians: 
household=5.2, community:2.9,​ other=3.3) see supplementary.  
 
● Measurement from multiple countries data aggregating effects of their different interventions: 
○ China, Vietnam, Japan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan - 77 transmission pairs ​(He et al. 
2020)​ “​serial interval ​was estimated to have a ​mean of 5.8 days​ (95% confidence 
interval (CI), 4.8–6.8 days) and a ​median of 5.2 days​ (95% CI, 4.1–6.4 days) based on a 
fitted gamma distribution, with 7.6% negative serial intervals” 
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○ Vietnam, South Korea, Germany, Taiwan, Singapore, China - 28 transmission pairs 
(Nishiura, Linton, and Akhmetzhanov 2020)​ ​- ​“lognormal distribution was selected as 
the best-fit model (WAIC = 224.0), while no significant differences from other models 
were identified. The ​median serial interval​ was estimated at ​4.0 days​ (95% credible 
interval [CrI]: 3.1, 4.9)”  
○ China, Vietnam, South Korea, Germany, Italy, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan - 40 
transmission pairs​ ​(Ferreti et al. 2020)​ - ​“we directly estimated the ​generation time 
distribution from 40 source-recipient pairs...The distribution is best described by a 
Weibull distribution with ​mean and median ​equal to​ 5.0 day​s and standard deviation of 
1.9 days”​. 
 
See further insights and analysis in a dedicated ​section​. 
 
Caveats​: 
● The serial interval is affected by policies of isolation and physical distancing. As such, 
measurements from one place and time (e.g. Wuhan before lockdown) should not be applied 
to another location (e.g. Lombardy after lockdown) unless there is good reason to do so. As 
mentioned for example in ​(Bi et al. 2020)​: “​It should be noted this estimate includes the effect 
of isolation on truncating the serial interval. Stratified results show that if the infector was 
isolated less than 3 days after infection the average serial interval was 3.6 days, increasing to 
8.1 days if the infector was isolated on the third day after symptom onset or later”. 
● In general it is hard to track large networks of transmissions. Some sources use very small 
numbers of infector-infectee pairs (e.g. < 10) to arrive at an estimate. 
● Possible biases in the selection of the pairs used for the analysis. In addition, recent contacts 
are easier to remember than distant contacts leading to bias in the backward contact tracing, 
toward shorter serial intervals. 
● Clusters of infections could make it difficult to determine which of several individuals is the 
infectee. 
  
Comparison to other pathogens​: 
● No lockdown:  
○ SARS - ​(Lipsitch et al. 2003) ​-​ ​“The ​mean serial interval​ in Singapore was ​8.4 days​ (SD = 
3.8)” 
○ MERS - ​(Cauchemez et al. 2016)​ - ​“We estimate that the ​serial interval ​(delay between 
symptom onset in a case and symptom onset in the persons they infect) of MERS-CoV 
has a​ mean of 6.8​ (95% CI: 6.0, 7.8) ​days ​and a SD of 4.1 (95% CI: 3.4, 5.0) days (Fig. 
2C).” 
○ Influenza  -​ (Cowling et al. 2009)​ - ​“We estimated the household​ serial interval​ of 
influenza to be ​between 3 and 4 days​”​. 
○ Tuberculosis - ​(Ma et al. 2018)​ - ​“the serial interval estimates from four studies were: 
0.57, 1.42, 1.44 and 1.65 years;” 
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Doubling time and exponential growth rate 
 
Definition​: The doubling time is the time it takes the cumulative number of cases to double. 
Exponential growth rate is the slope of the curve of the log of infected cases versus time. The growth 
rate r and  doubling time are connected by the equation: .τ r = τ
ln2  
 
Best estimate​: situation specific (depends on location and interventions) 
 
Methods of estimation​:  
The exponential growth rate is usually estimated by an exponential fit to the curve of cumulative 
infections.  
 
Estimate: 
● Outbreak in Wuhan and mainland China: 
○ Estimates on the basis of the reported number of cases: 
■ (Muniz-Rodriguez et al. 2020a)​ - ​“During January 20–February 9, the harmonic 
mean of the arithmetic means of the doubling times estimated from cumulative 
incidence ranged from ​1.4​ (95% CI 1.2–2.0) ​days in​ ​Hunan Province to 3.1​ (95% 
CI 2.1–4.8) days in ​Xinjiang Province​. We estimated doubling time as ​2.5​ (95% 
CI 2.4–2.6) ​days in Hubei Province​. The cumulative incidence doubled 6 times in 
Hubei  Province during the study period. The harmonic mean of the arithmetic 
means of doubling times for mainland China except ​Hubei Province was 1.8 
(95% CI 1.5–2.3) days. Fujian, Guangxi, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hunan, 
Jiangxi, Shandong, Sichuan, and Zhejiang provinces had a harmonic mean of the 
arithmetic means of doubling times <2 days (Figure; Appendix Figure 1).”  
■ (Li et al. 2020)​ - ​”In the epidemic curve up to January 4, 2020, the ​epidemic 
growth rate was 0.10 per day ​(95% CI, 0.050 to 0.16) and the​ doubling time was 
7.4 days ​(95% CI, 4.2 to 14).” 
○ Estimates on the basis of the number of cases exported from Wuhan to cities outside 
in mainland China and other countries: 
■ ַ(Zhanwei Du et al. 2020)  - ​“By fitting our epidemiologic model to data on the 
first 19 cases reported outside of China, we estimate an epidemic​ doubling time 
of 7.31 days ​(95% CrI 6.26–9.66 days) and a cumulative total of 12,400 (95% CrI 
3,112–58,465) infections in Wuhan by January 22 (Appendix).” 
■ (Wu et al. 2020a)​ - ​“In our baseline scenario, we estimated that R​0​ was 2·68 (95% 
CrI 2·47–2·86) with an ​epidemic doubling time of 6·4 days​ (95% CrI 5·8–7·1; 
figure 2). We estimated that 75815 individuals (95% CrI 37 304–130 330) 
individuals had been infected in Greater Wuhan as of Jan 25, 2020.” 
■ ַ(Chinazzi et al. 2020) -​ “Here we report the results for T​g​ = 7.5 days (20). The 
obtained posterior distribution provides an average R​0​ = 2.57 [90% confidence 
interval (CI): 2.37 to 2.78] and a ​doubling time of Td = 4.2 days​ (90% CI: 3.8 to 
4.7 days).” 
■ (Q. Zhao, Chen, and Small 2020)​ -​ “Assuming the travel rate to the selected 
countries and regions is constant over the study period, we found that the 
epidemic was ​doubling in size every 2.9 days ​(95% credible interval [CrI], 2 
days--4.1 days). Using previously reported serial interval for 2019-nCoV, the 
estimated basic reproduction number is 5.7 (95% CrI, 3.4--9.2)”​. 
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■ (Sanche et al. 2020)​ - ​“By using 2 distinct approaches, we estimated the ​growth 
rate​ of the early outbreak in Wuhan to be ​0.21–0.30 ​per day ​(a doubling time of 
2.3–3.3 days​)” 
 
See further insights and analysis in a dedicated ​section​. 
 
Caveats​: 
● If the fraction of cases that get detected changes over time, for example due to increased 
testing, it can bias estimates. Various alternative data sources such as the number of deaths 
can be used to compensate for varying ascertainment rates. 
● Studies make different assumptions about when exponential growth began (estimates range 
from the end of November to 31th of December 2019), which leads to wide variation in 
estimates of the growth rate and doubling time.  
● Our analysis (available ​here​) suggests that m​ost of the wide variation in the exponential 
growth rate, doubling times and reproduction number across studies of the Wuhan outbreak 
stems from the choice of the start date. Large exponential growth rates (and short doubling 
times) are mainly the result of assumptions regarding late initial time of exponential growth. 
● It is most difficult to estimate the magnitude of the outbreak in its early phases. The number 
of reported cases is not necessarily reliable, as case count data can be confounded by low 
surveillance intensity causing a deflation in the true number of cases.  
● In some cases inference was performed using international flight data and infected persons 
reported outside of China. Because of the low numbers of people traveling abroad compared 
with the total population size in Wuhan, this approach leads to substantial uncertainties. 
Inferences based on a low number of observations are prone to measurement error when data 
are incomplete or model assumptions are not fully justified. Furthermore, it was shown 
(Niehus et al. 2020)​ that in most countries there was underdetection of infected travellers 
returning from Wuhan (by a factor of close to 3 on average, when compared to the 
surveillance in Singapore). 
● The growth rate is connected to the reproduction number via the generation interval. Similar 
estimates for the growth rate may result in different reproduction numbers depending on 
different assumptions regarding the generation interval and its distribution. See for example 
(J. Wallinga and Lipsitch 2007)​. 
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Basic reproduction number 
 
Definition 
The basic reproduction number of an infection, R​0​, is defined as the expected number of secondary 
infections generated by an average infectious case in an entirely susceptible population. This quantity 
determines the potential for an infectious agent to start an outbreak, the extent of transmission in the 
absence of control measures, and the ability of control measures to reduce spread. 
In contrast to R​0​, the effective reproduction number, R​t​ (also denoted R(t) and R​e​), measures the 
number of secondary cases generated by an infectious case once an epidemic is underway (see the 
designated section for further details).  
 
Best estimate​: 2-6 (corresponding to doubling time of 2.5-7 days) 
 
Methods of estimation​: 
R​0​ and R​t​ values are derived from fitting epidemiological models to data about the pandemic. These 
data can include the number of reported cases, hospitalizations and deaths. Importantly, since R​0 
values are the product of a fitting procedure, their values depend on both the model and the quality of 
the underlying data.  
One approach to estimating R​0 ​is based on fitting the cumulative number of cases during initial 
phases of the epidemic. To estimate R​0​ this approach usually relies on the most basic connection 
between R​0 ​and the doubling time and growth rate (​r​). These two parameters are interrelated via  the 
generation interval (see relevant section). For a characteristic value of the generation interval g (units 
of days), with an exponential growth rate r (units of days​-1​) the connection is given by . TheR0 = erg  
epidemic grows by a factor of R​0​ over each generation interval.  In general, the generation interval is 
characterized by a distribution g(a) and not a single value, and the connection to R​0​ is expressed 
through the Lotka-Euler equation: . Here, M is the moment generatingg(a)da (− )1R0 = ∫
∞
a=0
e−ra = M r  
function of g(a), which has a familiar form for commonly used distributions. For a generation interval 
with a normal distribution where, are the mean and standard deviation of theR0 = erμ− (rσ)2
1 2   ,μ σ  
generation interval ​(J. Wallinga and Lipsitch 2007)​. This is also a good approximation for generation 
intervals following a gamma distribution. 
Other approaches use a compartmental model to estimate R​0​.​ ​Here R​0​ is derived from the rates 
connecting the different compartments. For example, in an SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Removed) 
model,  where  is the effective contact rate, and 𝛾 is the removal rate, equal to the inverse ofR0 = γ
β β  
the period of infectiousness. For general compartment models (such as SEIR) R​0 ​is given by the 
highest eigenvalue of the generation matrix (also known as the spectral radius). 
Various sources estimate R​0​ using the growth in the first stages of the outbreak and inference of the 
relevant rates from comparison to the number of infected. Comparison to various proxy data 
(exported cases, number of deaths) are used to validate and improve fits.  
 
Estimates​: 
● Outbreak in Wuhan and mainland China: 
○ Estimations  on the basis of the number of cases exported from Wuhan to cities 
outside in mainland China and other countries: 
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■ (Wu et al. 2020a)​ - SEIR model - ​“In our baseline scenario, we  estimated that R0 
was ​2·68​ (95% CrI 2·47–2·86) with an  epidemic doubling time of 6·4 days (95% 
CrI 5·8–7·1)”​. ​(assuming serial interval of 8.4, based on SARS) 
■ (Read et al., 2020) ​- ​SEIR model - ​“​We calculated the basic reproductive number, 
R​0​, of the infection to be ​3.11​ (95%CI, 2.39–4.13)​” 
■ (Imai et al., n.d.)​ -  ​Stochastic simulations of outbreak trajectories - ​“​We judge 
that the most likely estimate corresponds to the smallest level of zoonotic 
exposure explored here (40 cases), namely ​R​0​=2.6​ (Table 1 and Figure 1). 
Uncertainty caused by the intrinsically random nature of epidemics and the 
uncertainty in the level of zoonotic exposure gives a ​range of 1.5-3.5​...Assuming 
a shorter generation time (mean of 6.8 days rather than 8.4 days) reduces our 
central estimate of​ R​0​ to 2.1 ​(uncertainty range: 1.3-2.7)​” 
■ ַ(Zhanwei Du et al. 2020) - SEIR​ - ​“Basic reproductive number, ​R​0​: 1.90​ (95% CrI 
1.47–2.59​)”​ (given in the appendix, they got epidemic doubling time of 7.3 
days) 
■ (Sanche et al. 2020)​ - integration of high-resolution domestic travel data and 
early infection data reported in provinces other than Hubei -  ​“​To include a wider 
range of serial interval (i.e., 6–9 days) (Figure 5, panel A; Appendix 2 Figure 6), 
given the uncertainties in these estimations, we estimated that the median of 
estimated ​R is 5.7​ (95% CI of 3.8–8.9) (Figure 5, panel B). The estimated R can 
be lower if the serial interval is shorter” ​ (They estimated that the exponential 
growth rate of the outbreak is probably 0.21–0.3/day. Used high serial interval) 
■  ַַ(Chinazzi et al. 2020) - ​“Here we report the results for Tg = 7.5 days (20). The 
obtained posterior distribution provides an average​ R​0​ = 2.57​ [90% confidence 
interval (CI): 2.37 to 2.78] and a doubling time of Td = 4.2 days (90% CI: 3.8 to 4.7 
days).” 
 
○ Estimations on the basis of the reported number of cases: 
■ (Shen et al. 2020)​ - SEIJR model (SEIR + isolated compartment)  ​“​The basic 
reproduction number (R​0​) of 2019-nCov, an indication of the initial 
transmissibility of the virus, was estimated to be ​4.71​ (4.50-4.92) when the 
epidemic started on 12th December 2019​” ​ (used low rate of removal - inverse 
of time to isolation = 6 days) 
■ (T. Liu et al. 2020)​ - exponential growth rate -​ ​“The ​R​0​ ​values of NCP were ​4.5 
(95%CI: 4.4-4.6) and 4.4 (95%CI: 4.3-4.6) nationwide and in Wuhan, respectively” 
(assuming serial interval with mean of 7.5 and SD of 3.4) 
■ (Riou and Althaus 2020)​ - Stochastic simulations of outbreak trajectories - ​“​the 
early human-to-human transmission of 2019-nCoV was characterised by values 
of R​0​ around ​2.2​ (median value, with 90% high density interval: 1.4–3.8)” 
■ (Li et al. 2020)​ - exponential growth rate - ​“​Using the serial interval distribution 
above, we estimated that R​0​ was​ 2.2 ​(95% CI, 1.4 to 3.9)”​.​(the shorter generation 
time is closer to estimates of SARS-Cov2) 
■ (Tang et al. 2020)​ - modified SEIR (including isolation) - ​“Likelihood-based 
estimation of Rc during the outbreak in Wuhan gives a mean value of 6.39 with 
mean and variance of generation time of 6 and 2 days on the basis of a revised 
data series (dataRev1). The reproduction number based on likelihood-based 
estimation ranges from 1.66 to 10​“​ (They assume exponential growth started at 
1 Jan, resulting in a very high growth rate. Doubling time was about 2 days. 
High number of parameters in their model) 
15 
 
■ (S. Zhao, Lin, et al. 2020)​ - exponential growth​ ​“In Table 1, we estimated that the 
R​0​ ranges from ​2.24 ​(95%CI: 1.96-2.55) to ​5.71​ (95%CI: 4.24-7.54) associated 
with an 8-fold to 0-fold increase in the reporting rate” 
■ (S. Zhao, Musa, et al. 2020)​ - exponential growth with correction for 
underreporting of cases  - ​ ​“After accounting for the effect of under-reporting, 
the ​R​0​ was estimated at​ 2.56​ (95% CI: 2.49–2.63), see Figure 1b, which is 
consistent with many existing online preprints with range from 2 to 4 [5,20–22].” 
● Beginning of Spreading in other countries:  
○ South Korea and Italy - ​(Zhuang et al. 2020)​ -​ “​We modelled the transmission process in 
the Republic of Korea and Italy with a stochastic model, and estimated the basic 
reproduction number R​0​ as​ 2.6​ (95% CI: 2.3–2.9) ​or 3.2​ (95% CI: 2.9–3.5) in the ​Republic 
of Korea​, under the assumption that the exponential growth starting on 31 January or 5 
February 2020, and ​2.6​ (95% CI: 2.3–2.9)​ or 3.3​ (95% CI: 3.0–3.6)​ in Italy​, under the 
assumption that the exponential growth starting on 5 February or 10 February 2020, 
respectively”​ - assumed short serial interval distribution - gamma with mean 4.5 and 
standard deviation of 3.1 days - might be good estimate for Korea due to their 
aggressive policy, but not necessarily for the beginning of the epidemic in Italy. 
○ Iran - ​(Muniz-Rodriguez et al. 2020b)​ - ​“To determine the transmission potential of 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in Iran in 2020, we estimated ​the 
reproduction number as 4.4​ (95% CI 3.9–4.9) by using a generalized growth model and 
3.5​ (95% CI 1.3–8.1) by using epidemic doubling time.”​  - assumed short serial interval 
distribution: gamma with mean 4.5 and standard deviation of 3.1 days, despite no 
aggressive interventions.  
 
 
Comparison to other pathogens​: 
● SARS - ​(Lipsitch et al. 2003)​ -​ ​“an approximate estimate of R​0​ ranging from ​2.2 to 3.6​ for serial 
intervals of 8 to 12 days” 
● MERS - ​(Majumder et al. 2014)​ - ​“​IDEA model fits suggested a higher​ R​0​ in Jeddah (3.5-6.7) 
than in ​Riyadh (2.0-2.8)​; control parameters suggested more rapid reduction in transmission in 
the former city than the latter”. 
● Influenza  -​ (Biggerstaff et al. 2014)​ - ​“The ​median R​ value for ​1918 was 1.80​ (interquartile 
range [IQR]: 1.47–2.27). Six studies reported seven 1957 pandemic R values. The median​ R 
value for 1957 was 1.65​ (IQR: 1.53–1.70). Four studies reported seven 1968 pandemic R 
values. The median ​R value for 1968 was 1.80​ (IQR: 1.56–1.85). Fifty-seven studies reported 78 
2009 pandemic R values. The ​median R value for 2009 was 1.46​ (IQR: 1.30–1.70) and was 
similar across the two waves of illness: 1.46 for the first wave and 1.48 for the second wave. 
Twenty-four studies reported 47 seasonal epidemic R values. ​The median R value for seasonal 
influenza was 1.28​ (IQR:1.19–1.37)​”. 
 
Caveats​: 
● It is most difficult to estimate the magnitude of the outbreak in its early phases. The number 
of reported cases is not necessarily a good source, as case count data can be confounded by 
low surveillance intensity causing a deflation in the true number of  cases and reservoir 
spillover events stochasticity in the initial phase of the outbreak  (due to contact with Wuhan 
seafood market). The epidemic curve based on symptom onset after January 4 showed a very 
different growth rate . 
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● In some cases inference was performed by using international flight data and infected 
persons reported outside of China. Because of the low numbers of persons traveling abroad 
compared with the total population size in Wuhan, this approach leads to substantial 
uncertainties. Inferences based on a low number of observations are prone to measurement 
error when data are incomplete or model assumptions are not fully justified. Furthermore, it 
was shown ​(Niehus et al. 2020)​ that in most countries there was underdetection of infected 
travellers returning from Wuhan (by factor of close to 3 in average, when compared to the 
surveillance in Singapore). 
● The reproduction number is connected to the serial interval and growth rate. The early sources 
didn’t have reliable estimates for those, and thus are affected by the quality of their 
assumptions. 
● Our analysis suggests that m​ost of the wide variation in the exponential growth rate and 
reproduction number across studies of the Wuhan outbreak stems from the choice of the start 
day. Large reproduction numbers are mainly due to assumptions regarding late initial time of 
exponential growth. 
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Effective reproduction number 
 
Definition 
 
The effective reproduction number, R​t ​(also denoted by R(t), R and R​e​) measures the number of 
secondary cases generated by an infectious case at a given moment (t) once an epidemic is 
underway.  
Unlike the basic reproductive number, R​t​ is time and situation specific, used to characterize pathogen 
transmissibility during an epidemic, and enabling assessment of the effectiveness  of interventions. 
We should also emphasize the distinction  between the 'physical' versus 'operational' meaning of R​t​: 
the 'physical’ meaning of the number of infections an infectious person makes on average (as defined 
above) does not depend on the generation interval. However, the operational definition which is 
inferred from models fitted to the number of cases or derived from logarithmic slope of infection 
curves depends on serial interval. 
 
Best estimate​: situation specific (depends on location and interventions) 
 
Methods of estimation​: 
Like the basic reproduction number, R​t​ values may be derived from fitting epidemiological 
compartmental models to data about the pandemic. These data can include the number of reported 
cases, hospitalizations and deaths. The two basic types of models are compartment based models, 
such as SIR and SEIR, and renewal equation models.  
Estimation of effective R​t​ via compartment models is similar to the estimation of R​0​, and it makes use 
of the assumptions built into the model, such as: the different compartments and the distribution of 
time in each compartment. In order to estimate the effects of different interventions, such 
epidemiological models are also used to predict the R​t​ based on assumptions and observed 
epidemiological parameters. 
Other approaches for estimation of the effective reproduction number use only the serial/generation 
interval via the renewal function, like those of  ​(Cori et al. 2013; Jacco Wallinga and Teunis 2004)​. 
Renewal equation estimates themselves can be divided into two basic methods, which differ by the 
inference method, as well as the use of right censored data: 
● The first method ​(Jacco Wallinga and Teunis 2004)​ makes use of both past and future daily 
cases respective to the time step at which R​t​ is inferred. Thus, it estimates the average 
number of secondary cases that a case infected at time step t eventually infected, estimated 
in retrospect. This method is also referred to as the “case reproduction number”. 
● The second method ​(Cori et al. 2013; Thompson et al. 2019)​ only uses past daily cases. 
Hence, the method estimates the average number of secondary cases that each infected 
individual would infect if the conditions remained as they were at time t. This method is also 
referred to as  “the instantaneous reproduction number”. 
 
Estimates​: 
● Intensive interventions : isolation of patients with symptoms, contact tracing, physical 
distancing, including restriction (or advising against) of  large social gatherings in order to 
mitigate the risk of community transmission: 
○ Singapore ​(Tariq et al. 2020)​ - characterized daily incidence of local cases using the 
generalized logistic growth model (GLM) after adjusting for imported cases: ​“​The 
effective reproduction number​ peaked with a mean value ~1.0 between February 6-12, 
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2020 and declined thereafter. As of March 5, 2020, our most recent estimate of ​R​t​ is at 
0.9 ​(95% CI: 0.7,1.0)​” 
○ South Korea ​(Shim et al. 2020)​ - generalized growth model: ​“​... the intrinsic growth rate 
(r) was estimated at 0.6 (95% CI: 0.6, 0.7) and the scaling of growth parameter (p) was 
estimated at 0.8 (95% CI: 0.7, 0.8), indicating sub-exponential growth dynamics of 
COVID-19 in Korea (Figure 2, Table 3). The ​mean reproduction number R​t​ was estimated 
at 1.5​ (95% CI: 1.4, 1.6) as of Feb 26 2020​.” 
○ Hong Kong ​(Cowling et al. 2020)​ - Using the method by ​(Thompson et al. 2019)​, 
improved version of the approach of  ​(Cori et al. 2013)​ “​Although unlinked COVID-19 
cases have been detected in increasing numbers since early March, ​transmissibility (R​t​ ) 
remains around the critical threshold of ​1 (figure 2)” 
○ Sweden - no lock down ​(Folkhalsomyndigheten 2020)​ - ​using ​(Jacco Wallinga and 
Teunis 2004)​ method​  -​ “During the first month the estimates of Re were very unstable. 
After that, Re reached a maximum of 1.4 at the beginning of April, and steadily 
decreased after that. By the middle of April R​e​ fluctuated around the value of one during 
a week, and since 21 April it has slightly dropped below one”​ (based on the incidence 
growth curve, assuming serial interval of 4.8 days) 
● Interventions in Wuhan - before and after lockdown 
○ (Lipsitch M, Keya J, Cobey S.E. 2020)​ following ​(Pan et al. 2020)​ - using ​(Jacco 
Wallinga and Teunis 2004)​ method during the period of local lockdown (period 3)  R​t 
dropped below 1 and reached 0.3 by the end of March -​ ​“taking into account the evident 
decline of the epidemic curve that began during Period 3, finds that R​t​ dropped below 1 
during Period 3, specifically on 28-29 Jan. (Fig. 1)​” 
○ (C. Wang et al. 2020)​ - extended SEIR model to account for population movement, 
unascertained cases, and quarantine by hospitalization  -​ “The ​effective reproductive 
numbe​r dropped from 3.86 (95% credible interval 3.74 to 3.97) before interventions to 
0.32​ (0.28 to 0.37)​ post interventions​” 
● Interventions in other countries -  before and after lockdown 
○ France ​(Salje et al. 2020)​ - deterministic compartmental model stratified by age - from 
figure 4 R​0​=3.3 and R​lockdown​=0.5 
○ 11 European countries ​(Flaxman et al., 2020)​ - semi-mechanistic Bayesian hierarchical 
model​ attempts to infer the impact of the various interventions (assuming each has 
the same relative effect on R, independent of the country). Based on reported death 
cases - ​“We estimate large changes in 𝑅​𝑡​ in response to the combined 
non-pharmaceutical interventions. Our results, which are driven largely by countries with 
advanced epidemics and larger numbers of deaths (e.g. Italy, Spain), suggest that these 
interventions have together had a substantial impact on transmission, as measured by 
changes in the estimated reproduction number Rt. Across all countries we find current 
estimates of ​R​t​ to range from a posterior mean of 0.97 [0.14-2.14] for Norway to a 
posterior mean of 2.64 [1.40-4.18] for Sweden, with an average of 1.43 across the 11 
country posterior means​, a 64% reduction compared to the pre-intervention values” 
 
See further insights and analysis in a dedicated ​section​. 
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Caveats​: 
● Various interventions such as isolation of symptomatic patients and contact tracing affect 
both the average number of secondary cases generated by an infected individual as well the 
serial interval itself.Usually the models assume a constant serial interval and consider only 
possible changes in R​t​. Thus the models infer the ‘operational’ R​t ​that correspond to a constant 
serial interval. 
● Similar to the basic reproduction number, the effective reproduction number also depends on 
the quality of the data regarding the number of cases taken as is from formal reports, or 
estimated based on proxies such as traveling data. 
● Other caveats relevant to the basic reproduction number are also relevant to the time specific 
statistics: 
○ It is most difficult to estimate the magnitude of the outbreak in its early phases. The 
number of reported cases is not necessarily a good source, as case count data can be 
confounded by reservoir spillover events, stochasticity in the initial phase of the 
outbreak, and low surveillance intensity. 
○ inference was performed by using international flight data and infected persons 
reported outside of China. Because of the low numbers of persons traveling abroad 
compared with the total population size in Wuhan, this approach leads to substantial 
uncertainties . Inferences based on a low number of observations are prone to 
measurement error when data are incomplete or model assumptions are not fully 
justified. Furthermore, it was shown ​(Niehus et al. 2020)​ that in most countries there 
was underdetection of infected travellers returning from Wuhan. 
 
Comparison to other pathogens​: 
● SARS - 
○ (Wallinga and Teunis 2004)​ - ​”During the early phase of the SARS epidemic... Each case 
produced approximately three secondary infections (table 1). A value of ​R slightly higher 
than 3​… Around mid-March, control measures were implemented in all regions, and 
during this period the effective reproduction numbers decreased sharply… After the first 
World Health Organization global alert, each case produced​ approximately 0.7 
secondary infections” 
○ (Cori et al. 2013)​ - ​“For the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong in 2003, we find 2 successive 
peaks in R. The first occurred in the middle of week 3 with a median estimate of 12.2 
(95% CI: 10.0–14.7), and the second occurred at the end of week 6 with a median 
estimate of 2.6 (95% CI: 2.4–2.9). R then fell below 1 by the end of week 7.” 
● MERS -​ ​(Thompson et al. 2019)​ - ​fig 5: R​t​ fluctuated between 10/14 to 1/16 between  maximal 
value of less than 2.5, minimal value of about 0.5. 
● Influenza  - ​(Thompson et al. 2019)​ ”The ​median reproduction number​ estimate for the first 
seven days of the outbreak (April 18th–April 24th 2009) ​was 3.3​ – with 95% credible interval 
(95% CrI) given by (2.1,5.6) – and the mean estimate for this period was 3.4”​. 
● Ebola  - 
○ (Althaus 2015)​ - using SEIR model - ​ ​“I fitted an EVD transmission model to previously 
published data of this outbreak and estimated the basic reproduction number R​0​ = 5.2 
(95% CI [4.0–6.7]). The model  suggests that the net reproduction number ​R​t​ fell below 
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unity 28 days​ (95% CI [25–34] days) after the onset of symptoms in the index case”.​ See 
figure 2 for details. 
○ (Thompson et al. 2019)​ -​ fig 4: estimates for R​t​ in Liberia depend on the assumption of 
serial interval distribution’s shape.  
Online tools to estimate the effective reproduction number in various locations 
● https://mrc-ide.github.io/covid19-short-term-forecasts/#individual-model-outputs 
● https://covid19-projections.com/infections-tracker/ 
● http://rt.live/ 
● https://mrc-ide.github.io/covid19estimates/#/ 
(​https://github.com/ImperialCollegeLondon/covid19model​) 
● http://trackingr-env.eba-9muars8y.us-east-2.elasticbeanstalk.com/ 
● https://covidactnow.org/ 
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Secondary infections dispersion 
 
Definition 
The “offspring distribution” of an epidemic is the distribution of the number of secondary cases due 
to each primary infection. The mean of this distribution is R​t​ by definition, though R​t​ values derived 
from fits might differ from this true R​t​ value due to incorrect assumptions or issues associated with 
the fitting process. The offspring distribution is generally considered to adopt a negative binomial 
distribution which is characterized by a mean (R​t​) and a dispersion parameter k, such that the 
variance is given by R​t​(1+R​t​/k). The negative binomial distribution is generally used instead of 
Poisson to allow for unequal mean and variance. Smaller values of k indicate greater heterogeneity. 
In general k<<1 is associated with a high number of ‘superspreaders’ - individuals that infect much 
more than the average R​0.​ Values of k>1 are associated with a low number of ‘superspreaders’, as the 
number of secondary cases of each primary infection is relatively even. 
 
The formula of the probability density is given by:  
(n) ( ) ( )p = n! Γ(k)
Γ(n+k) k
k+Rt 
k Rt
k+Rt 
n
 
(the limits of this distribution are the Poisson distribution, when k→∞ and the geometric distribution 
when k=1). 
Best estimate​:  0.1-40 
Methods of estimation​: 
Estimation is made based on a chain transmission model, in which each infected person transmits 
the infection to a number of subjects sampled randomly from a distribution with mean R​t​ and 
dispersion k. Usually, the model is compared to data regarding the size of different clusters (for 
different countries, for example) with an initial number of spreaders (for example, known imported 
cases).  
 
Other methods use empirical data regarding the number of secondary cases in a defined cluster with 
good documentation. They fit the transmission data to a negative binomial distribution to extract an 
estimate for the dispersion parameter.  A version of this method, proposed by ​(Lloyd-Smith et al. 
2005)​ makes use of only the average number of secondary cases and the proportion of cases with no 
secondary transmission by numerically solving an equation that connects the probability of 
no-transmission with the dispersion.  
 
Estimates​: 
 
● Early outbreak: 
○ Early spreading in Wuhan  - ​(Riou and Althaus 2020)​ - ​“​The observed data at this point 
are compatible with a​ large range of values for the dispersion parameter k​ (median: 
0.54, 90% high density interval: 0.014–6.95). However, our simulations suggest that very 
low values of k are less likely.” 
○ Early spreading in Republic of Korea and in Italy - ​(Zhuang et al. 2020)​ - ​“Estimates of 
dispersion term ​(​k​) were ​10​ (95% CI: 5-56) or ​22​ (95% CI: 8-61) in​ Republic of Korea​, and 
13​ (95% CI: 5-61) or ​37​ (95% CI: 13-61) in ​Italy​, and all of which imply few 
super-spreading events” 
○ Early spreading in several countries - ​(Endo et al. 2020)​ -​ “The result of the joint 
estimation  suggested the likely bounds for R​0​ and k (95% CrIs: R​0​ 1.4–12;​ k 0.04–0.2​)​”​. 
● Containment effort - physical distancing and contact tracing: 
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○ China, Shenzhen - ​(Bi et al. 2020)​ - contacts tracing - ​“​The mean number of secondary 
cases caused by each index case (i.e., the observed reproductive number, R), was 0.4 
(95% CI 0.3,0.5). ​The distribution of personal reproductive numbers was highly 
overdispersed, with 80% of infections being caused by 8.9%​ (95% CI 3.5,10.8) of cases 
(negative binomial ​dispersion parameter 0.58,​ 95% CI 0.35, 1.18)​.”  
○ Hong Kong under strong containment - ​(Adam et al. 2020)​- ​“​From the empirical 
offspring distribution and fitted negative binomial distribution shown in Figure 2B, we 
estimated an observed reproductive number (R) of 0.58 (95% CI: 0.45 – 0.71) and 
dispersion parameter (k) of 0.45​ (95% CI: 0.31 – 0.76). Given a superspreading of 6-8 
secondary cases, we directly observed 2-4 SSEs where the source was known. 
Likelihood analysis ​based on final cluster sizes increased the estimate of R to 0.75 (95% 
CI: 0.6 – 0.96) and ​decreased estimates of k to 0.37​ (95% CI: 0.16 – 1.16). Based on 
these estimates we determined a coefficient of variation of 2.5 and inferred that 
approximately 20% of SARS-CoV-2 infections are responsible for 80% of all transmission 
events in Hong Kong” 
○ Singapore under strong containment - ​(Tariq et al. 2020)​ ​-​ ​“​The dispersion parameter is 
estimated at​ 0.4​ (95% CI: 0.1, Inf.) indicating higher transmission heterogeneity” 
● China outside of Hubei Province under travel lockdown - ​(D. He et al. 2020), ​(Xu et al. 2020)​ - 
“we obtained raw data of number of secondary cases from a study by Xu et al [4], where ​k​ can 
be readily calculated as​ 0.8 ​(95%CI 0.63, 0.98).” 
● Diamond princess  -​ (S. Zhao, Cao, et al. 2020)​ -​ ​“We estimate the​ dispersion term (k) to be 44 
(95%CI: 6−88), which is significantly larger than 1 and consistent with [7]. The simulation results 
with or without dispersion term (k) ​were largely consistent, which suggests absence of 
superspreading events​ (note that low k implies high chance of superspreading events)”​. 
 
Caveats​: 
● Some of the analysis relies on the overall size of clusters and their initial number of spreaders. 
However, in an emerging disease it is hard to assess the total size of the cluster as it depends 
on the fraction of the population being tested (and the testing policy). In addition, the initial 
number of (imported) cases may be influenced by miss detection of a few cases. 
● It is not always clear from case reports which cases are epidemiologically linked. Hence, the 
extent and precision of the epidemiological investigation could also affect the assessment of 
cluster sizes and the proportion of cases with no secondary infections. 
● Many of the interventions meant to control the spreading, like isolation of symptomatic 
patients and contact tracing, affect the dispersion, as they aim to prevent events of large 
spreading (as well as the mean = R​0​). Thus, it is important to divide the data according to the 
level of intervention 
 
Comparison to other pathogens​: 
● (Lloyd-Smith et al. 2005)​ - analyzed  previous directly transmitted infections (Fig. 1b, c and 
Supplementary Tables 1, 2): 
SARS - ​0.16 ​(90%CI  0.11-0.64) 
Measles (US 1997-1999) - ​0.23​ (0.16-0.39) 
Smallpox (Europe, Benin, Pakistan) - ​0.32-0.72 
● MERS - ​(Kucharski and Althaus 2015)​ -  ​“Our estimate for MERS-CoV is similar, with​ k = 0.26 
(90% CI: 0.11– 0.87, 95% CI: 0.09–1.24)”​. 
● Influenza (1918 Pandemic) - ​(Fraser et al. 2011)​ - ​0.94 ​(0.59-1.72) (taken from table 1) 
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Asymptomatic infections fraction 
 
Definition​: The fraction of infected people not showing noticeable symptoms throughout their 
infection. Note, this is different from pre-symptomatic patients, who carry the virus but will only show 
symptoms later (once their incubation period has passed).  
 
Best estimate​: ​20-50% overall, with strong age dependence such that estimates depend strongly on 
demographics.  
 
Methods of estimation​: 
There are two main methods for estimating the fraction of asymptomatic infections. The first method 
randomly samples the population to identify the subset of infected individuals, and then follows-up on 
those cases to see if they develop symptoms.  
The second method relies on epidemiological compartment models. In these models, the fraction of 
asymptomatic cases can be represented by a unique compartment separate from the symptomatic 
cases. The fraction of asymptomatic cases is one parameter in this model, which could be fitted, i.e. 
inferred, along with the other parameters of the model, to time course data of the epidemic. 
 
Estimates​: 
● Random sample 
○ Iceland - 1221 cases (​Gudbjartsson et al. 2020​) - “​Notably, ​43%​ of the participants who 
tested positive reported having no symptoms, although symptoms almost certainly 
developed later in some of them​” 
○ Vo, Italy - 81 cases - (​Lavezzo et al. 2020​) - “​Notably, ​43.2% ​(95% CI 32.2-54.7%) of the 
confirmed SARS CoV-2 infections detected across the two surveys were asymptomatic​”  
○ Korea, call center - 97 cases - ​(Park et al. 2020)​ - “​The role of asymptomatic COVID-19 
case-patients in spreading the disease is of great concern. Among 97 confirmed 
COVID-19 case-patients in this study, ​4 (4.1%)​ ​remained asymptomatic​ during the 
14-days of monitoring​” (72%) were women; mean age was 38 years (range 20–80 
years) 
○ Shenzhen, China - 391 cases - ​(Bi et al. 2020)​ “​Further, in this group, ​20% were 
asymptomatic ​at the time of first clinical assessment and nearly 30% did not have 
fever​”.  
○ Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture - ​(Song et al. 2020)​ - 83 cases - “​18 (18/83, ​21.7​%) 
individuals were identified as ​asymptomatic​ carriers, with a predominant distribution of 
males (61.0%) (Table 1). The median age was 31 years and one third of the 
asymptomatic individuals were students, aged under 20 years​”. 
 
● Epidemiological models 
○ Wuhan - (​Davies et al. 2020​) - “​The age-dependent clinical proportion was markedly 
lower in younger age groups in all regions (Fig 2b), with 20% of infections in children 
under 10 resulting in clinical cases, rising to over 70% in adults over 70 in the consensus 
age distribution estimated across all regions.”​ Thus, 80% asymptomatic cases in 
children under 10 and 30% in adults over 70. A simple average over the averages of the 
age groups in Table 3 yields an average of ​57%​. Non clinical cases include 
asymptomatic as well as mild cases, not reported or documented. 
Caveats​: 
● Reporting of mild symptoms is subjective and so the dividing line between pre-symptomatic 
and asymptomatic cases is not well-defined. 
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● While in some cases, a large collection of samples were taken, very challenging to take a truly 
random sample of a large population. Many studies report the asymptomatic fraction for a 
highly idiosyncratic study population that certainly differs greatly from the general population, 
for example the passengers of the Diamond Princess. 
● To estimate the true fraction of asymptomatic cases, researchers need to follow-up on cases 
which did not show symptoms at the time of testing to verify that these are truly 
asymptomatic and not presymptomatic cases.  
● Even though there is evidence that asymptomatic cases have viral loads similar to those of 
symptomatic cases ​(Zou et al. 2020)​, there are, on the other hand, also reports of a 
connection between the severity of symptoms and viral load ​(Liu et al. 2020)​. Thus there are 
contradictory reports on the relationship between symptom severity and the viral load, so it is 
unclear if asymptomatic cases would be harder to detect in random surveys. If asymptomatic 
cases indeed go undetected, this will cause an underestimation of their true fraction. 
● When performing random population testing, the false positive and false negative rates of the 
test need to be accounted for in order to accurately project the associated uncertainty of the 
estimates based on the tests. This may lead to significant over-estimation of asymptomatic 
cases in screening tests, where the disease prevalence is very low.  
Lower quality data 
● Small sample sizes: 
○ Japanese citizens evacuated from Wuhan, China - 13 cases - (​Nishiura et al. 2020​)- 
“Using a binomial distribution, the asymptomatic ratio is thus estimated at ​30.8%​ (95% 
confidence interval (CI): 7.7%, 53.8%)”​ (sample size was very small). 
○ Korea - 23 cases ​(Ki et al. 2020)​ - ​“Of the 28 infected patients diagnosed in Korea, 3 
were asymptomatic” 
○ Hubei - 23 cases ​(Long et al. 2020)​ - ​“A total of ​16​ out of 164 cases were confirmed by 
RT-PCR during Jan 31 to Feb 9, 2020, with 3 cases reporting no symptoms. The other 
148 cases were no symptoms and negative in RT-PCR tests. On March 1, 2020, serum 
samples were collected from these 164 cases for antibody tests. The 16 RT-PCR 
confirmed cases were positive in IgG or/and IgM. Strikingly, ​7​ of the 148 cases who 
were excluded previously by negative nucleic acid results also showed positive results in 
IgG or/and IgM, indicating that 4.3% (7/162) of close contacts were missed by nucleic 
acid test. In addition, about 6.1% (​10​/164) of this cohort were asymptomatic infection.”​ - 
There were 10 asymptomatic cases among a total of 23 caes identified.  
● Non representative sample: 
○ USA, Nursing home in Washington - ​(Arons et al. 2020)​ - ​6%​ (3/48) ​“Of the 48 residents 
who tested positive from the surveys, 17 (35%) reported typical symptoms, 4 (8%) 
reported only atypical symptoms, and 27 (56%) reported no new symptoms or changes 
in chronic symptoms at the time of testing… In the 7 days after their positive test, 24 of 
the 27 asymptomatic residents (89%) had onset of symptoms and were recategorized 
as presymptomatic”​  - mean age of 76, 98% with coexisting conditions. 
○ Diamond Princess - (​Mizumoto et al. 2020​) - delay adjusted - ​“The estimated 
asymptomatic proportion was ​17.9%​ (95% credible interval (CrI): 15.5–20.2%)” ​(mostly 
old age people) - older population 
○ Children in China (​Dong et al​) - ​“For the severity of patients (including both confirmed 
and suspected cases), 94 (​4.4 %​), 1091 (50.9 %) and 831 (38.8 %) patients were 
diagnosed as asymptomatic, mild or moderate cases, respectively, totally accounted for 
94.1 % of all cases.”​ - Only children, not clear if suspected cases are indeed cases 
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○ Repatriation flights to Greece  40 cases -  (​Lytras et al. 2020​) - Table 1. 35 
asymptomatic cases out of 40 positive cases or ​87.5%.​ “​The passengers’ median age 
was 27 years (interquartile range 22–40 years)” 
○ Pregnant women admitted for delivery ​(Sutton et al. 2020)​ - ​“Thus, 29 of the 33 patients 
who were positive for SARS-CoV-2 at admission (​87.9%​) had no symptoms of Covid-19 
at presentation.” 
○ Homeless shelter in Boston, USA ​(Baggett et al. 2020)​ - ​“A total of 147 participants 
(36.0%) had PCR test results positive for SARS-CoV-2. Men constituted 84.4% of 
individuals with PCR-positive results and 64.4% of individuals with PCR-negative results. 
Among individuals with PCR test results positive for SARS-CoV-2, cough (7.5%), 
shortness of breath (1.4%), and fever (0.7%) were all uncommon, and ​87.8%​ were 
asymptomatic.” 
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Household secondary attack rate 
 
Definition​: The fraction of the infectee’s household members that they infect on average.  
 
Best estimate​: ​15% 
 
Methods of estimation​: The secondary attack rate is usually estimated based on contact tracing data. 
By identifying the primary infected individual in the household, other household members are tested 
and secondary infections are identified. The secondary attack rate is calculated as the fraction of the 
household members of an infected individual who end up infected with the virus. 
 
Estimates​: 
● (Bi et al. 2020)​ -  “​The household secondary attack rate was ​11·2%​ (95% CI 9·1–13·8), and 
children were as likely to be infected as adults.​” 
● (Jing et al. 2020)​ - “​We estimated the household SAR to be ​13.8%​ (95% CI: 11.1-17.0%) if 
household contacts are defined as all close relatives and ​19.3%​ (95% CI: 15.5-23.9%) if 
household contacts only include those at the same residential address as the cases​”  
● (Wang et al. 2020)​ - “​The rate of secondary transmission among household contacts of patients 
with SARS-CoV-2 infection was ​30%​” 
● (Park et al. 2020)​ - “​The household secondary attack rate among symptomatic case-patients 
was ​16.2%​ (95% CI 11.6%– 22.0%)​” 
● (WHO 2020)​ - “​Household transmission studies are currently underway, but preliminary studies 
ongoing in Guangdong estimate the secondary attack rate in households ranges from ​3-10%​” 
● (Korean CDC 2020)​ - “​There were 119 household contacts, of which 9 individuals developed 
COVID-19 resulting in a secondary attack rate of ​7.56%​ (95% CI 3.7–14.26)​” 
● (Burke et al. 2020)​ - “​and a symptomatic secondary attack rate of ​10.5%​ (95% CI = 2.9%–31.4%) 
among household members.​” 
● (Cheng et al. 2020)​ - “​The attack rate was higher among household (​4.6%​ [95% CI, 2.3%-9.3%]) 
and nonhousehold (5.3% [95% CI, 2.1%-12.8%]) family contacts than that in health care or other 
settings​” 
● (Luo et al. 2020)​ - “​Among different modes of contact, 53 household contacts were the most 
dangerous in catching with infection of 54 COVID-19, with an incidence of ​10.2%.​” 
● (Chen et al. 2020)​ - “​Living with the case ​(13.26%)​, taking the same transportation (11.91%), 
dinner and entertainment (7.18%) are all high-risk factors for infection​” 
● (Li et al. 2020)​ - “​Total 105 index patients and 392 household contacts were enrolled… The 
secondary attack rate of SARS-CoV-2 in household is ​16.3%.​” 
 
See further insights and analysis in a dedicated ​section​. 
 
Caveats​: 
● The detection of cases following a contact tracing study may miss some of the infections if 
the timing of the study is in sync with the progression of infection of household members, and 
is subject to the detection error rates of the detection method. 
● In some cases only clinical cases are identified, thus underestimating the true secondary 
attack rate. 
● There could be cases in which there was either more than one infector in the household, or 
that some people in the household got infected from a source other than the household. 
● The specific attack rate could change based on the awareness of the disease, hygiene and 
physical distancing measures.   
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Case fatality rate (CFR) 
 
Definition​: The total number of fatalities divided by the total number of confirmed cases 
 
Best estimate​: ​1-15%  
(uncorrected for age structure, selection bias, ascertainment rate, time delays etc.) 
 
Methods of estimation​: Descriptive statistics based on summary of gathered data. Possible biases 
not taken into account in this estimate are specified in the caveats section. 
 
Estimates​: 
● Global country statistics from Worldometer analyses by our open script​ (accessed on 
31/05/2020) - We use data from all countries with more than 50 death cases and calculate the 
uncorrected raw Case Fatality Rate for each country. The range represents the lowest and 
highest rates observed. 
 
Caveats​: 
● Several key factors can affect the death toll. First, demographic parameters and practices 
associated with increased or decreased risk differ greatly across societies. For example, the 
capacity of the healthcare system, the average age of the population, and the prevalence of 
smoking. Indeed, the majority of people dying from SARS-CoV-2 have a preexisting condition 
such as a cardiovascular disease or smoking ​(China CDC 2020)​.  
● There is a potential for overestimating the CFR due to a tendency to identify more severe 
cases (selection bias) which will tend to overestimate the CFR.  
● There is usually a delay between the onset of symptoms and death, which can lead to an 
underestimate of the total number of deaths early in the progression of an epidemic.  
● Attribution of cases could sometimes be challenging, with some deaths unaccounted for due 
to lack of testing or due to registration under a different cause of death. 
 
Estimates of corrected CFR: 
● Wu et al. 2020​ - “​Using public and published information, we estimate that the overall 
symptomatic case fatality risk (the probability of dying after developing symptoms) of COVID-19 
in Wuhan was ​1.4%​ (0.9–2.1%)​” 
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Infection fatality rate (IFR) 
 
Definition​: The total number of fatalities divided by the total number of infected people 
 
Best estimate​: ​0.3-1% 
 
Methods of estimation​: 
Estimating the total number of infected people, and thus the IFR, requires testing a random sample of 
the population.  
 
The main methods used for estimating the IFR are: 
● Testing of semi-random samples using RT-qPCR 
● Testing of semi-random samples via serology (antibody) testing 
● Model-based estimates 
 
Because people who were infected and recovered do not show as positive with viral RNA 
quantification methods, the ideal way to estimate the number of infected people is testing for the 
presence of antibodies (serosurvey) against SARS-CoV-2 in random samples. As serosurveys were 
not available in the early stages of the pandemic, researchers resorted to semi-random samples 
tested with qPCR, or to modelling-based estimates. As of writing (May 2020), several serosurveys are 
being conducted and results with IFR estimates are starting to be released.  
 
Estimates​: 
● Semi-random samples using RT-PCR: 
○ Repatriation flights from China - ​(Verity et al. 2020)​ - “​We obtain an overall IFR estimate 
for China of ​0.66​% (0.39%,1.33%)​” and ​(Ferguson et al. 2020)​ - “​The IFR estimates from 
Verity et al.12 have been adjusted to account for a non-uniform attack rate giving an 
overall IFR of ​0.9% ​(95% credible interval 0.4%-1.4%).​”  
○ Diamond Princess - ​(Russel et al. 2020)​ - “​We estimated that the all-age cIFR on the 
Diamond Princess was ​1.3%​ (95% confidence interval (CI): 0.38–3.6) ​” 
● Model-based estimates: 
○ Estimates for early epidemic in China (​Mizumoto et al 2020​) -​ “​crude infection fatality 
ratio (IFR) and time–delay adjusted IFR is estimated to be 0.04% (95% CrI: 
0.03%–0.06%) and ​0.12%​ (95%CrI: 0.08–0.17%)​” 
○ France ​(Salje et al. 2020)​ - “​We find 2.6% of infected individuals are hospitalized and 
0.53%​ die, ranging from 0.001% in those <20y to 8.3% in those >80y. ​” based on data 
from the Diamond Princess incorporated into a statistical model. 
● Serosurveys: 
○ Germany - ​(Streeck et al. 2020)​ - “​Die Letalität (case fatality rate) bezogen auf die 
Gesamtzahl der Infizierten in der Gemeinde Gangelt beträgt mit den vorläufigen Daten 
aus dieser Studie ca. ​0,37 %.​” 
○ Denmark  - ​(Erikstrup et al. 2020)​ - “​Using available data on fatalities and population 
numbers a combined IFR in patients younger than 70 is estimated at ​82 per 100,000 ​(CI: 
59-154) infections​” To translate the IFR for people under 70 to the total IFR, please 
consider this twitter ​tread  
○ Santa-Clara, CA, USA - ​(Bendavid et al. 2020)​ - Due to methodical problems with this 
study the results are not indicative and thus not presented.  
● Unpublished serosurveys 
○ New York State - ​link​ (doesn’t give an IFR estimate yet).  
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○ Los Angeles County - ​link​ (doesn’t give an IFR estimate yet).  
○ Spain - ​link​ (doesn’t give an IFR estimate yet).  
○ Indiana - ​link​ - “​IUPUI scientists estimate the infection-fatality rate for the novel coronavirus in Indiana to 
be ​0.58 percent​” 
 
Caveats​: 
Caveats associated with estimating the IFR can be divided into those affecting the numerator, i.e. the 
total number of fatalities, and those affecting the denominator, i.e. the total number of infected 
people.  
● Caveats associated with estimating the number of fatalities: 
○ Demographic parameters and practices associated with increased or decreased risk 
differ greatly across societies. For example, the capacity of the healthcare system, the 
average age of the population, and the prevalence of smoking. Indeed, the majority of 
people dying from SARS-CoV-2 have a preexisting condition such as cardiovascular 
disease or smoking ​(China CDC 2020)​.  
○ There is usually a delay between the onset of symptoms and death, which can lead to 
an underestimate of the total number of deaths early in the progression of an 
epidemic.  
○ Attribution of cases could sometimes be challenging, with some deaths unaccounted 
for due to lack of testing or due to registration under a different cause of death. 
● Caveats associated with estimating the total number of infected people: 
○ To get a good estimate of the prevalence infected people using a random and 
representative sample of the population must be taken. In many cases, achieving such 
random sampling is very challenging, and in most cases it is hard to determine how 
representative the sample is. For example, people who have experienced the hallmark 
symptoms of SARS-CoV-2 may be more inclined to enroll in an open study. 
○ When the prevalence of a disease is low, false positive results may skew the results 
significantly. Many of the testing done relies on methods with non-negligible false 
positive and false negative rates, and thus the reported estimates may have significant 
uncertainty associated with them, if the false positive rate of the test was not 
accounted for appropriately.  
○ The detection of infected individuals using PCR based tests is sensitive to the time at 
which the test was performed relative to the progression of the disease in infected 
individuals. In the first days of infection or close to recovery, the viral load of infected 
individuals can be under the detection limit of PCR tests and thus infections might be 
missed. 
● Caveats specific to serosurveys: 
○ The usage of a small number of defined SARS-CoV-2 proteins in antibody tests, e.g. 
spike and/or nucleoprotein, can result in underestimates. 
○ The detection of infected individuals is sensitive to the time at which the test was 
performed relative to the progression of the disease. It requires about 2 weeks on 
average for antibodies to reach detectable levels.  
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Probability of hospitalization 
 
Definition​: The fraction of infected individuals that need to be hospitalized due to their conditions. 
 
Best estimate​: ​ 2-4% of infected ​(could be much higher, e.g. 20%, of ​confirmed​ ​cases​ as most mild 
cases can remain untested) 
 
Methods of estimation​: 
Descriptive statistics based on summary of gathered hospitalization data. Often divided by age 
groups, gender and comorbidities. This value must be scaled to the total number of infected people, 
similar to the rescaling of CFR to infer IFR. Estimation of the number of infected people requires 
testing a random sample of the population. Because people who were infected and recovered do not 
show as positive with viral RNA quantification methods, the ideal way to estimate the number of 
infected people is testing for the presence of antibodies (serosurvey) against SARS-CoV-2 in random 
samples. As these were not available in the early stages of the pandmeic, researchers resorted to 
semi-random samples tested with qPCR, or to modelling-based estimates. Current estimates rely on 
semi-random samples, used to correct hospitalization data. 
 
Estimates​: 
● The fraction of ​infected individuals​ that need to be hospitalized (based on semi-random 
samples): 
○ Repatriation flights from Wuhan, China (adjusted for under-ascertainment rates by 
comparison to other locations in China):   
■ (Verity et al. 2020)​ - “​The demography-adjusted and 
under-ascertainment-adjusted proportion of infected individuals requiring 
hospitalisation ranges from ​1·1% in the 20–29 years age group up to 18·4% in 
those 80 years ​and older​” ​(Table 3 for age distribution. Assuming a uniform 
attack rate. Hospitalization of only severe patients). 
■ (Ferguson et al., 2020)​ - “​The age-stratified proportion of infections that require 
hospitalisation and the infection fatality ratio (IFR) were obtained from an 
analysis of a subset of cases from China (Verity et al.). These estimates were 
corrected for non-uniform attack rates by age and when applied to the GB 
population result in an IFR of 0.9% with​ 4.4% of infections hospitalised​ (Table 1)​” 
(assuming hospitalization of only severe patients)) 
○ Vo, Italy - ​(Lavezzo et al. 2020)​ - ​“​Of the 81 SARS-CoV-2 positive patients across the two 
surveys, 14 ​required hospitalization (17.2%)​. Their age distribution was as follows: 1 
(7.1%) in the 41-50 age group, 2 (14.3%) in the 51-60 age group, 4 (28.6%) in the 61-70 
age group, 5 (35.7%) in the 71-80 age group and 2 (14.3%) in the 81-90 age group​” 
○ Synthesis of total infected cases from Diamond Princess with ICU and hospitalization 
data from France - ​(Salje et al. 2020)​ - “​We find that ​2.6% of infected individuals are 
hospitalized​ (95% CrI: 1.4-4.4), ranging from 0.09% (95% CrI: 0.05-0.2) in females under 
<20y to 31.4% (95% CrI: 16.7-52.6) in males >80y.​” (see table for distribution for sex and 
age). 
● The fraction of ​confirmed cases ​that need to be hospitalized (based on surveys) 
○ China - ​(Wu and McGoogan 2020)​ -​ “​Most cases were classified as mild (81%; ie, non 
pneumonia and mild pneumonia). However,​ 14% were severe​ (ie, dyspnea,  respiratory 
frequency 30/min, blood oxygen saturation 93%, partial pressure of arterial oxygen to 
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fraction of inspired oxygen ratio <300, and/or lung infiltrates >50% within 24 to 48 
hours), and​ 5% were critical​ (ie, respiratory failure, septic shock, and/or multiple organ 
dysfunction or failure)​” 
○ USA 
■ (Bajema et al. 2020)​ -​ “​All 210 persons who were tested were symptomatic… 
Forty-two ​(20%) patients were hospitalized​, and four (2%) were admitted to an 
intensive care unit.​” 
■ Louisiana - ​(Price-Haywood et al. 2020)​ - “​A total ​of 39.7% of Covid-19–positive 
patients​ (1382 patients) were ​hospitalized​, 76.9% of whom were black” they 
conclude: “Black race was not associated with higher in-hospital mortality than 
white race, after adjustment for differences in sociodemographic and clinical 
characteristics on admission​”. 
■ Among Children in the USA - ​(CDC COVID-19 Response Team 2020)​ - 
“​Information on hospitalization status was available for 745 (29%) cases in 
children aged <18 years and 35,061 (31%) cases in adults aged 18–64 years. 
Among children with COVID-19, 147 (estimated range = ​5.7%–20%​) were 
reported to be ​hospitalized​, with 15 (0.58%–2.0%) admitted to an ICU (Figure 2)​”. 
see figure for age distribution 
 
Caveats​: 
Caveats associated with estimating the probability of hospitalization can be divided into those 
affecting the numerator i.e. the total number of individuals need to be hospitalized and those 
affecting the denominator, i.e. the total number of infected people.  
● Caveats associated with estimating the number of fatalities: 
○ Patients in need of hospitalization can be in different conditions. Health systems in 
places which suffer from a high number of infections would tend to hospitalize only 
patients with severe conditions, but in other situations patients with milder conditions 
would also be hospitalized. 
○ Hostpitalization probability is highly dependent on age and sex, thus the overall 
hospitalization in a country is affected by its population age structure, as well as the 
different attack rate  among different ages. 
○ Underlying conditions and comorbidity are factors affecting the severity of the disease. 
Their prevalence is correlated with age, but differs between countries. Thus, it may 
alter the probabilities, and  make it difficult to estimate it correctly for other countries. 
● Caveats associated with estimating the total number of infected people in studies regarding 
early stages of the epidemic: 
○ Non random sampling, common at early stages of the epidemic. 
○ Relaying on a small number of individuals, divided to several age groups,  to assess the 
fraction of infected individuals. Specifically, the sample size of known cohorts for 
young ages (<20y) is very small. 
 
Comparison to other pathogens​: 
● SARS - ​(Rainer et al. 2004)​ - very few percent do not need hospitalization “​Of 910 patients who 
were managed without hospitalization, 6 patients had serologic evidence of SARS. Five of the 
6 patients had normal chest radiographs, and 4 patients had symptoms such as myalgia, 
chills, coughing, and feeling feverish”. 
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Probability of ICU admission  
 
Definition​: The fraction of hospitalized individuals that are admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). 
Often regarded as the fraction of hospitalized patients in critical condition (i.e., respiratory failure, 
septic shock, and/or multiple organ dysfunction or failure). 
 
Best estimate​:​ 10-40%​ (large variation between health systems).  
 
Methods of estimation​: 
Descriptive statistics based on summary of gathered hospitalization data. Often divided by age 
groups, gender and comorbidities. 
 
Estimates​: 
● China, Wuhan 
○ (D. Wang et al. 2020)​ - ​26% ​of hospitalized were admitted to ICU​ ​ “Compared with 
patients who ​did not receive ICU care (n=102)​, patients who​ required ICU care (n=36) 
were significantly older (median age, 66 years [IQR, 57-78] vs 51 years (IQR, 37-62];  
P<.001) and were more likely to have underlying comorbidities​” 
○ (Huang et al. 2020)​ -​ “​Of the 41 patients, 13 ​(32%) were admitted to the ICU ​because 
they required high-flow nasal cannula or higher-level oxygen support measures to 
correct hypoxaemia​” 
○ (Yang et al. 2020)​ -​ ​27% ​of hospitalized were critical (55 of 201 included​)​ - see figure 1. 
● China - ​(Wu and McGoogan 2020)​  - ​“​Most cases were classified as mild (81%; ie, non 
pneumonia and mild pneumonia). However,​ 14% were severe​ (ie, dyspnea,  respiratory 
frequency 30/min, blood oxygen saturation 93%, partial pressure of arterial oxygen to fraction of 
inspired oxygen ratio <300, and/or lung infiltrates >50% within 24 to 48 hours), and​ 5% were 
critical​ (ie, respiratory failure, septic shock, and/or multiple organ dysfunction or failure)​” ​ The 
estimate of ​25%​ is based on dividing the number of critical cases by the number of severe 
cases (similar to critical out of hospitalized, as mostly only severe cases are hospitalized in a 
crowded health system) 
● Lombardy Region, Italy​ - ​(Grasselli, Pesenti, and Cecconi 2020)​ - “​The​ proportion of ICU 
admissions represents​ 12% of the total positive cases, and ​16% of all hospitalized patients​. 
This rate is higher than what was reported from China, where only 5% of patients who tested 
positive for COVID-19 required ICU admission​”. 
● France,  analysis of probability by age, based on data combined with incidents from Diamond 
Princess  - ​(Salje et al. 2020)​ -  “​Once hospitalized, 18.2%​ (95% CrI: 18.0%-18.6%) ​patients enter 
ICU​ after a mean delay of 1.5 days (Figure S1). There is an increasing probability of entering ICU 
with age - however, this drops for those >70y (Figure 2B, Table S2).​.”​ (see table for distribution 
for sex and age). 
● New York - ​(Richardson et al. 2020)​ - from Table 5, ​22%of hospitalized patients​ (1281/5700) 
were admitted to the ICU. 
● China, Shanghai - ​(Chen et al. 2020)​ - “​A total of 22 (​8.8%​)​ patients were admitted in ICU ​8.5 
±4.0 days after onset of symptoms​”. 
● USA (end of January) - ​(Bajema et al. 2020)​ - ​10% ​of hospitalized were admitted to ICU.  
“​Forty-two ​(20%) patients ​were hospitalized, and four ​(2%)​ were admitted to an intensive care 
unit​.” 
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● Louisiana, USA - ​(Price-Haywood et al. 2020)​ - ​“​More than one third​ of admitted patients (474 
patients) ​received care in an intensive care unit​, among whom 80.2% were black patients.” 
from table 2: 29.5% of White Non-Hispanic patients and 35.7% of Black Non-Hispanic patients 
● Georgia, USA - ​(Gold et al. 2020)​ - ​“​Intensive care unit​ (ICU) ​admission occurred ​among 119 
(​39.0%​) patients and increased significantly with age group: among patients aged ≥65 years, 
53.8% were admitted to an ICU (p<0.001). Overall, 92 (30.2%) patients received IMV, 
representing 77.3% of those admitted to an ICU.”​ Similar fractions among Whilat and Black 
patients. 
● Specific for children: 
○ China - ​(Dong et al. 2020)​ - ​ ​“The proportions of severe and critical cases were 10.6%, 
7.3%, 4.2%, 4.1%, and 3.0% for the age groups ,1, 1 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 15, and >16 years, 
respectively...with much fewer being severe and critical cases (5.8%) than in adult 
patients (18.5%)” ​Based on Table 2, we estimate a probability of ​10%​ for ICU 
admissions from the ratio of ​critical cases to cases in severe or critical condition 
○ USA - ​(CDC COVID-19 Response Team 2020)​ ​about 10% ​-​ ​“Information on 
hospitalization status was available for 745 (29%) cases in children aged <18 years and 
35,061 (31%) cases in adults aged 18–64 years. Among children with COVID-19​, 147 
(estimated range = 5.7%–20%) were reported to be hospitalized, with ​15​ (0.58%–2.0%) 
admitted to an ICU (Figure 2)”​. 
(see figure for age distribution) 
 
Caveats​: 
● Patients in need of hospitalization can be in different conditions. Health systems in places 
which suffer from a high number of infections would tend to hospitalize only patients with 
severe conditions and thus have higher probability of ICU admission. 
● Both hostpitalization and ICU admission probabilities are highly dependent on age and sex, 
thus the overall hospitalization of a country is affected by its population age structure, as well 
as the different attack rate  among different ages. 
● Underlying conditions and comorbidity are factors affecting the severity of the disease. Their 
prevalence is correlated with age, but differs between countries. Thus, it may alter the 
probabilities, and  make it difficult to estimate it correctly for other countries. 
 
Comparison to other pathogens​: 
● SARS - ​(Joynt and Yap 2004)​ -​ “​Approximately 20%​ of patients with severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) develop respiratory failure that ​requires admission to an intensive care unit 
(ICU)”​.  
● MERS - ​(Matsuyama et al. 2016)​ -​ ​“​The risks of ICU admission​ and mechanical ventilation 
ranged from 44.4 to 100% and from 25.0 to 100%, with pooled estimates at​ 78.2​ and 73.0%, 
respectively” 
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Probability of death in ICU 
 
Definition​: The fraction of infected patients that were admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) who 
didn’t survive.  
 
Best estimate​:​ ​20%-80% 
 
Methods of estimation​: 
Descriptive statistics based on summary of gathered hospitalization data. Often divided by age 
groups, gender, ethnicity and comorbidities. 
 
Estimates​: 
● In health systems crowded by the outbreak: 
○ China, Wuhan 
■ (D. Wang et al. 2020)​ - ​17% ​of patients admitted to ICU​ ​have died ​“Of the 36 
patients admitted to the ICU, 11 were still in the ICU, 9 had been discharged to 
home, 10 had been transferred to the general wards, and 6 had died”. 
■ (Huang et al. 2020)​ - ​“​13 (32%) patients were admitted to an ICU and six (​15%​) 
died”. 
■ (Yang et al. 2020)​ - ​“32 (​61.5%​) of ​critically ill patients had died​ at 28 days. Of 
all included patients, 37 (71%) required mechanical ventilation and 35 (67%) had 
ARDS.” 
○ New York, USA  - ​(Richardson et al. 2020)​ ​- ​According to Table 5, ​78% (291/373) of the 
ICU patients who had outcomes​ (been discharged or died) ​have died​. Due to the 
overcrowding of the health system, a ​similar number of patients have died without 
being admitted to the ICU​ - ​“Among the ​2634 patients ​who were discharged or had died 
at the study end point, during hospitalization, 373 (14.2%) were treated in the ICU, 320 
(12.2%) received invasive mechanical ventilation, 81 (3.2%) were treated with kidney 
replacement therapy, and ​553 (21%) died​ (Table 5).”  
○ Lombardy Region, Italy - ​(Grasselli et al. 2020)​ - ​61% of ICU patients with outcomes 
have died​ (405/661). 26% of admitted (including those stille in ICU). This fraction may 
be overestimated due to censoring effects. ​“Among the 1581 patients with ICU 
disposition data available as of March 25, 2020, 920 patients (58% [95% CI, 56%-61%]) 
were still in the ICU, 256 (16% [95% CI, 14%-18%]) were discharged from the ICU, and 405 
(26% [95% CI, 23%-28%]) had died in the ICU. Older patients (n = 786; age 64 years) had 
higher mortality than younger patients (n = 795; age 63 years) (36% vs 15%; difference, 
21% [95% CI, 17%-26%]; P < .001)​” 
○ Britain - ​(ICNARC 2020c)​ - from Table 10, ​43% ​(3481/8060) have died in critical care 
(out of those with outcomes). See table for separation by age, ethnicity , gender and 
more. 
● In less crowded health systems: 
○ China, Shanghai - ​(Chen et al. 2020)​ - ​22% of ICU patients with outcomes have died 
(2/9).“​A total of 22(8.8%) patients were admitted in ICU... To the time of submission, a 
total of 215 (86.3%) patients were discharged after 16(12–20) days hospitalization, 13 
patients were still in ICU and 19 patients in stable condition. A total of 2 patients died 
(0.8%).​”. 
○ Georgia, USA - ​(Gold et al. 2020)​ - “​As of April 24, 2020, 24 (7.9%) patients remained 
hospitalized, including 14 (58.3%) in the ICU and nine (37.5%) on IMV. Overall, the 
estimated ​percentage of deaths among patients who received ICU care​ ranged from 
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37.0%, assuming all remaining ICU patients survived, to 48.7%, assuming all remaining 
ICU patients died”​. 
● Probability of death of ​hospitalized​ patients: 
○ France,  analysis of probability by age, based on data combined with incidents from 
Diamond Princess  -  ​(Salje et al. 2020)​ -  ​”​Overall, ​18.1%​ (95% CrI: 17.8–18.4) of 
hospitalized​ individuals go on to die​”. Very close to the fraction of admitted to ICU 
(18.2%).  
○ Louisiana, USA - ​(Price-Haywood et al. 2020)​ - from table 2, ​25% ​of ​hospitalized 
patients with outcomes have died (326/1320). Among White patients about 31% die, 
while only 22% among Black patients. 
Caveats​: 
● Patients in need of hospitalization can be in different conditions. Health systems in places 
which suffer from a high number of infections would tend to hospitalize only patients with 
severe conditions and thus have higher probability of ICU admission. Moreover, overcrowding 
of ICU may result in critical patients not being admitted to ICU at all. 
● Censoring of ICU outcomes (i.e. outcomes being available for only part of the patients during 
the spread) may bias the death probability to higher values as the duration of stay in ICU is 
longer for patients who recover. This is also shown in previous reports from ICNARC (​ICNARC 
2020a​, ​ICNARC 2020b​). 
● Hostpitalization, ICU admission and death probabilities are highly dependent on age and sex, 
thus the overall hospitalization in a country is affected by its population age structure, as well 
as the different attack rate among different ages groups. 
● Underlying conditions and comorbidity are factors affecting the severity of the disease. Their 
prevalence is correlated with age, but differs across countries.  
 
Comparison to other pathogens​: 
● SARS - ​(Joynt and Yap 2004)​ -​ “​Long-term mortality​ for patients admitted to the ICU ranges 
from ​30% to 50%​.”​.  
● MERS -  ​(Matsuyama et al. 2016)​ -​ From fig 4, among four studies that consider only ICU 
cases, the death probability ranged from ​58% to 75%​. 
 
   
36 
 
 
 
RT-qPCR False Positive Rate 
 
Definition​: The fraction of uninfected people who test positive for SARS-CoV-2 via RT-qPCR. The false 
positive rate is often reported as “specificity” which is the fraction of negatives test results that are 
true negatives (i.e. uninfected). The false positive rate (in %) is 100% - specificity.   
 
Best estimate​: 0.2-2% 
 
Methods of estimation​: Testing of samples from patients known not to have SARS-CoV-2 based on 
various modes of testing. 
 
Estimates​: 
● RT-qPCR testing of uninfected patients 
○ (Jiang et al. 2020)​ - ​“The ​sensitivity and specificity of RT-PCR for pharyngeal were 
78.2% and 98.8%​. Positive predictive value and negative predictive value were 91.9% 
and 96.2. and Youden’s index was 0.770, which indicated overall performance.“ 
● Comparison of RT-qPCR assays that differ in reagents and primer sets 
○ (Barra et al. 2020)​ - ​“​We observed consistent false positive results for N and N2​ (60 out 
of 60 samples for both). N3 assay generated false positive signal or inconclusive results 
in 13 out of 60 tested samples. N2, N3, and N assays were not considered for 
subsequent experiments due to the lack of analytical specificity under our conditions 
(figure 1).” 
● Negative controls (no template or no primers) of viral RT-qPCR assays 
● Comparison to established RT-qPCR testing for other RNA viruses 
○ (Merckx et al. 2017)​ Table 2 gives a pooled estimate of 99.2% (95% confidence interval 
of 98.6-99.7%) for influenza A and 99.4% (98.9-99.8) for influenza B. 
 
Caveats: 
● RT-qPCR is used to quantify (q) the amount of viral genomic RNA in patient samples. It works 
by monitoring the progress of a reverse-transcriptase (RT) PCR via the fluorescence of a DNA 
binding dye. Since DNA accumulates over the course of the reaction and dye fluorescence is 
increased by DNA binding, fluorescence reports on reaction progress. It is common to report 
“cycle threshold” values (Ct values) for RT-qPCR. Ct values report the cycle number at which 
dye fluorescence crossed a predefined threshold. The earlier the threshold is crossed, the 
lower the Ct value and the more RNA was in the sample. A positive test is one with a Ct value 
beneath a prespecified threshold (e.g. Ct < 40), though this threshold will vary from between 
specific tests (e.g. which primers were used). 
● The false positive rate or specificity of RT-qPCR testing is only rarely reported in studies 
investigating RT-qPCR tests of SARS-CoV-2.  
● False positives are likely to be dominated by errors in sample handling, as false positives are 
uncommon in RT-qPCR in general.  
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RT-qPCR False Negative Rate 
 
Definition​: The fraction of people infected with SARS-CoV-2 who test negative by a single RT-qPCR 
test. The false negative rate is often reported as “sensitivity” which is the fraction of negative test 
results that are true positives (i.e. were previously infected). The false negative rate (in %) is therefore 
100% - sensitivity.   
 
Best estimate​: 5-30​% ​depending on kit 
 
Methods of estimation​: RT-PCR testing of confirmed SARS-CoV-2 patients in the days immediately 
following the onset of symptoms. Patients are typically identified via an initial positive RT-qPCR test 
and a second diagnostic method, e.g. a CT scan of the lungs.  
 
Estimates​: 
● RT-qPCR testing of confirmed SARS-CoV-2 patients 
○ (J. Zhao Jr. et al. 2020)​ Figure 2, Table 2 and results - ​“As the results shown in Figure 2 
and Table 2, ​in the early phase of illness within 7-day since onset, the RNA test had the 
highest sensitivity of 66.7%​, whereas the antibody assays only presented a positive rate 
of 38.3%.” 
○ (Jiang et al. 2020)​ - ​“Combination of RT-PCR and CT has the higher sensitivity 
(91.9%,79/86) than ​RT-PCR alone (78.2%，68/87)​ or CT alone (66.7%, 54 of 81) or 
combination of two RT-PCR tests (86.2%,75/87).“ 
● Meta-analysis of published test results 
○ (Wikramaratna et al. 2020)​ - ​“The probability of a positive test decreases with the 
number of days past symptom onset; for a nasal swab, the percentage chance of a 
positive test declines from 94.39% [86.88, 97.73] on day 0 to 67.15% [53.05, 78.85] by 
day 10.” 
● Comparison to established RT-qPCR testing for other RNA viruses 
○ (Merckx et al. 2017)​ Figure 3 gives pooled sensitivity of 92% (95% confidence interval 
of 85–96%) for influenza A and 95% (87-99%) for influenza B.  
 
Caveats: 
● RT-qPCR is used to quantify (q) the amount of viral genomic RNA in patient samples. It works 
by monitoring the progress of a reverse-transcriptase (RT) PCR via the fluorescence of a DNA 
binding dye. Since DNA accumulates over the course of the reaction and dye fluorescence is 
increased by DNA binding, fluorescence reports on reaction progress. It is common to report 
“cycle threshold” values (Ct values) for RT-qPCR. Ct values report the cycle number at which 
dye fluorescence crossed a predefined threshold. The earlier the threshold is crossed, the 
lower the Ct value and the more RNA was in the sample. A positive test is one with a Ct value 
beneath a prespecified threshold (e.g. Ct < 40), though this threshold will vary from between 
specific tests (e.g. which primers were used). 
● The false negative rate of RT-qPCR testing depends greatly on sample handling, storage and 
protocol details, which might explain the wide range of estimates. 
● Double testing of the same patient may substantially reduce the false negative rate and is 
recommended by the CDC and several references ​(Jiang et al. 2020)​.   
● Similar, confirmatory testing by CT ​(Jiang et al. 2020)​ scan or antibody tests ​(J. Zhao Jr. et al. 
2020)​ appears to reduce the false negative rate as well. 
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Duration of PCR positivity 
 
Definition​: The number of days post symptom onset for which >50% of infected people test positive 
by RT-qPCR. Notably, viral shedding and, hence, PCR-positivity, begins several days after infection.  
 
Best estimate​: ≈7-9 days 
 
Methods of estimation​: RT-PCR testing of confirmed SARS-CoV-2 patients in the days following the 
onset of symptoms. Patients are typically identified via an initial positive RT-qPCR test and potentially 
a second diagnostic method, e.g. a CT scan of the lungs.  
 
Estimates​: 
● RT-qPCR testing of confirmed SARS-CoV-2 patients 
○ (J. Zhao Jr. et al. 2020)​ Figure 2, Table 2 and results - ​“As the results shown in Figure 2 and 
Table 2, ​in the early phase of illness within 7-day since onset, the RNA test had the highest sensitivity of 
66.7%​, whereas the antibody assays only presented a positive rate of 38.3%.” 
○ (Young et al. 2020)​ - ​“Among the 18 hospitalized patients with PCR-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection 
(median age, 47 years; 9 [50%] women), clinical presentation was an upper respiratory tract infection in 12 
(67%), and ​viral shedding from the nasopharynx was prolonged for 7 days or longer among 15 (83%)​.” 
○ (To et al. 2020)​ Figure 2 and text - ​“Of the 21 patients who survived, seven (33%) had viral RNA 
detected for 20 days or longer after symptom onset.” 
● Re-analysis of published PCR testing results 
○ (Wikramaratna et al. 2020)​ Figure 3, which replots data from ​(Bi et al. 2020a) 
 
Caveats: 
● The period of >50% PCR positivity may not begin immediately after onset of symptoms. 
References report a ≈1 day lag from initial symptom onset, but this is due to a low number of 
measurements at early timepoints in ​(J. Zhao Jr. et al. 2020)​.  
● Error rates associated with RT-qPCR testing will depend greatly on sample handling, storage 
and protocol details, which might explain the wide range of estimates. 
As with all PCR testing, the error rates will depend on the choice of primers.   
39 
 
Antibody Test False Positive Rate 
 
Definition​: The fraction of uninfected people who test positive for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. The false 
positive rate is often reported as “specificity” which is the fraction of negatives test results that are 
true negatives (i.e. uninfected). The false positive rate (in %) is 100% - specificity.   
 
Best estimate​: 0.1-15%, corresponding with a specificity of ≈85-99.8% 
 
Methods of estimation​: testing of samples from patients known not to have SARS-CoV-2 because the 
samples were taken before the epidemic began (e.g. banked blood donations).  
 
Estimates​: 
● Testing of pre-epidemic samples 
○ (Whitman et al. 2020)​ - ​“​Test specificity ranged from 84.3-100.0%​ in pre-COVID-19 
specimens.”  
○ (J. Zhao Jr. et al. 2020)​ - ​“The ​specificity of the assays for Ab, IgM and IgG was 
determined as 99.1% (211/213), 98.6% (210/213) and 99.0% (195/197)​ by testing of 
samples collected from healthy individuals before the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2” 
○ (Bryan et al. 2020)​ - ​“We tested 1,020 serum specimens collected prior to SARS-CoV-2 
circulation in the United States and found one false positive, ​indicating a specificity of 
99.90%​.” 
● Comparison to established immunological testing for other RNA viruses 
○ (Merckx et al. 2017)​ Table 2 gives a pooled specificity estimate of 99.4 (95% 
confidence interval 99.1-99.7%) for influenza A and 99.8% (99.7-99.9%) for influenza B.  
 
Caveats 
● Serology tests assay the presence of antibodies in the bloodstream. As antibodies only 
develop ≈10 days after the onset of symptoms ​(J. Zhao Jr. et al. 2020; To et al. 2020)​ these 
tests are not useful for diagnosing patients with active disease. Rather, serology testing or 
“serosurveys” are used to measure the incidence of the infection in the population at large in 
order to determine the state of the epidemic. Because these tests have non-trivial 
false-positive and false-negative rates, great care should be taken in interpreting the results of 
serosurveys. 
● Since antibodies take ≈10 days to develop. However, the timing of infection is often unknown. 
In practice, therefore, the timing of the test will be a major factor affecting test results. 
● Error rates will depend both on which testing approach (or specific kit) is used as well as the 
sample collection, storage and sample handling procedures. We report a range that includes 
kit-to-kit variability as reported in ​(Whitman et al. 2020)​ but this does not include between-lab 
differences in sampling, transport and preparation. 
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Antibody Test False Negative Rate 
 
Definition​: The fraction of previously infected people who test negative for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. 
Since it takes time for antibodies to develop, we report a rate estimate for tests conducted 10 or more 
days after symptoms. The false negative rate is often reported as “sensitivity” which is the fraction of 
negative test results that are true positives (i.e. were previously infected). The false negative rate (in 
%) is 100% - sensitivity.   
 
Best estimate​: 10-30%, corresponding to a selectivity of 70-90% 10+ days after symptom onset. 
 
Methods of estimation​: testing of samples from patients known to have SARS-CoV-2 by a 
combination of RT-qPCR and clinical markers (e.g. symptoms and CT scans).  
 
Estimates​: 
● Testing of samples from patients with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 10+ days after onset of 
symptoms. 
○ Table 2 of ​(Whitman et al. 2020)​ gives sensitivity as a function of days since 
patient-reported onset of symptoms. Note that the sample number is small in this 
study (< 30 for all bins).  
○ (J. Zhao Jr. et al. 2020)​ Figure 2 and results section - ​“In samples from patients during 
day 8-14 after onset, the ​sensitivities of Ab (89.6%), IgM (73.3%) and IgG​ ​(54.1%)​ were 
all higher than that of RNA test (54.0%).” 
○ (Bryan et al. 2020)​ -​ “The sensitivity of the assay from the estimated day of symptom 
onset for the 125 patients included in our chart-review study was 53.1% (95% CI 
39.4%-66.3%) at 7 days, ​82.4% (51.0-76.4%) at 10 days, 96.9% (89.5-99.5%) at 14 days, 
and 100% (95.1%-100%) at day 17 using the manufacturer’s recommended cutoff of 
1.4.” 
● Comparison to established immunological testing for other RNA viruses 
○ (Merckx et al. 2017)​ Table 2 gives a pooled sensitivity estimate of 54.4% (95% 
confidence interval 48.9-59.8%) for influenza A and 53.2% (41.7-64.4%) for influenza B.  
 
Caveats 
● Serology tests assay the presence of antibodies in the bloodstream. As antibodies only 
develop ~10 days after the onset of symptoms ​(J. Zhao Jr. et al. 2020; To et al. 2020)​ these 
tests are not useful for diagnosing patients with active disease. Rather, serology testing or 
“serosurveys” are used to measure the incidence of the infection in the population at large in 
order to determine the state of the epidemic. Because these tests have non-trivial 
false-positive and false-negative rates, great care should be taken in interpreting the results of 
serosurveys. 
● Since antibodies take ~10 days to develop. However, the timing of infection is often unknown. 
In practice, therefore, the timing of the test will be a major factor affecting test results. 
● As above, error rates will depend both on which testing approach (or specific kit) is used as 
well as the sample collection, storage and sample handling procedures. We report a range 
that includes kit-to-kit variability as reported in ​(Whitman et al. 2020)​ but this does not include 
between-lab differences in sampling, transport and preparation. 
● The range we report (15-30% false negative rate) is the empirical range from ​(Whitman et al. 
2020)​ and does not include statistical estimates of uncertainty. A statistical estimate of the 
95% confidence interval on test sensitivity gives much wider ranges. 
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Insights from the data 
 
How does the basic reproduction number, R​0​, relate to the doubling time of the epidemic? 
The basic reproduction number of an infection, R​0​, is defined as the expected average number of 
secondary infections generated by someone who is infected when the population is still close to 
entirely susceptible (i.e. only a small fraction of the population has already been infected). R​0 
describes how many people an infected individual infects, but not the duration it takes an infected 
person to infect others. The characteristic time between when a person was infected until he/she 
infects others is called the “generation interval”. Both the R​0​ and the generation interval vary between 
individuals, but we can define average values for both of them to build a simple model of how they 
govern the spread of the disease. This basic model implies that the number of infected people as a 
function of time will be proportional to R​0​(t/g)​ where g is the generation interval. This means that the 
number of cases increases by a factor of R​0 ​every g days. Consider an example epidemic where the 
number of cases initially doubles every 4 days. If the generation interval is also 4 days, then R​0​ is 2 
and thus causes the doubling every 4 days. If instead the generation interval is 8 days, then R​0​ would 
have to be 8 instead of 4, even though the doubling time of the epidemic did not change. Therefore, it 
is crucial to agree upon the value of the generation interval when aiming to compare values of R​0​. 
The generation interval is described by a distribution and not a single value. The simple connection 
between R​0 ​and the doubling time (𝜏) can be extended to account for a distribution of generation 
intervals. See a detailed discussion in ​(J. Wallinga and Lipsitch 2007)​. 
 
Early in the current pandemic, there was substantial uncertainty about the distribution of generation 
intervals and various researchers used different values to derive estimates of R​0​. As such, one should 
take care in comparing R​0​ values between studies, making sure to evaluate the assumptions about 
the doubling time and generation intervals that were used to infer R​0​ (see ​here​ an analysis that 
illustrates this point by plotting R​0​ against the serial interval for studies of the early stages of the 
epidemic in Wuhan, China). The serial interval (the interval between infector and infectee symptom 
onset) is used as a proxy for the generation interval because it is simpler to evaluate. R​0​ estimates 
depend on the assumed serial interval and doubling time in a complex fashion, leading to wide 
variation (≈2-6) in R​0​ inferences.  
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Figure XX Estimates of the R​0​ and the resulting doubling time. ​The estimates are presented as a 
scatter plot versus the assumption of the mean serial interval (which is equal to the mean generation 
time). In a few cases where the assumption regarding the serial interval wasn’t explicit, we extracted it 
from other assumptions of the model. The background of the figure is colored by analytic estimates of 
the doubling times, derived from R​0​, the mean serial interval and an assumption that the serial interval is 
gamma distributed with a coefficient of variation of 50% (similar to explicit assumptions in some of the 
sources). In the few cases in which the source provides its estimate for the doubling rate, the results 
are similar (but not identical). Markers of studies with identical serial intervals were slightly displaced to 
prevent overlap. The markers are colored by the initial day in which the model assumes the exponential 
growth has begun (except for one source ​(S. Zhao, Lin, et al. 2020)​ for which the parameter couldn’t be 
found).  
 
 
Figure YY. The correlation between the basic reproduction number and the initial date of exponential 
growth. ​The connection between R​0​ and ​t​0​ ​is shown via a scatter plot with linear regression (R​2​=0.52, 
positive correlation with p value of 8x10​-4​). 
 
What causes large differences between estimates of R​0​ for the same place? 
Although sources differ in their assumptions about the distribution of generation intervals, these 
differences are not the largest factor affecting the estimated R​0​. We find that a larger influence on R​O 
arises from the presumed start date of the epidemic, denoted t​0​. Sources that assumed a start date 
near Dec. 1 2019 considered a much longer time period than studies assuming a start date in January 
2020. Fitting over longer time periods gave slower growth rates in general, as can be seen from the 
following example. Let's assume that on Jan. 20th there were 1024 cases. To get to 1024 cases from 
1 patient, it would take 10 doublings (2​10​ = 1024). So if exponential growth began on the 31​st​ of 
December that would mean a doubling time of 20/10 = 2 days. But if the exponential growth was 
assumed to begin on December 1​st​, that would mean that the doubling time is 50/10=5 days. This 
effect can be seen in figure XX, where the color indicates the t​0​ taken in each source, and in figure YY 
that shows the correlation between the t​0​ and the basic reproduction number, given by a regression 
line with R​2​=0.52, indicating a relatively high correlation. From the analysis of the difference sources, 
it appears that only one source directly inferred the initial data of growth from the model ​(Steven 
Sanche et al. 2020)​ while the others just assumed that the growth began on a specific date, even 
though the results are sensitive to this assumption. In conclusion, it seems that the​ wide variation in 
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the exponential growth rate and reproduction number across studies of the Wuhan outbreak stems 
from the choice of the analysis start day. 
 
 
How does the isolation of infected patients affect transmission of the virus? 
Quarantine and contact tracing are common means of slowing epidemics like COVID-19. These 
strategies involve the isolation of patients known or likely to be infected. When an individual is found 
to be infected (e.g. by PCR testing), they can be isolated to avoid causing secondary infections. 
Contact tracers can then identify people this patient has been in close contact with in recent days so 
that those people can isolate until their infectious period has passed. Isolation reduces the average 
number of secondary infections produced from a single infection, bringing it down from the basic 
reproduction number (R​0 ​the average number of people an infected person infects with no mitigation) 
to a lower number termed the effective reproduction number or R​t​. Isolation also indirectly affects 
disease characteristic time between when a person was infected and the time when he/she infects 
other people, also known as the “generation interval”. To help conceptualize this effect, consider a 
case in which on average an infected person infects 4 people over the course of 4 days, one person 
one each day. This translates into an R​t​ of 4 and an average generation interval of 2.5 days. Now let’s 
consider the effect of quarantining infected people 2 days after their infection. These infected people 
can now only infect others on the first and second days, bringing their R​t​ to 2, and shortening their 
generation interval to 1.5 days. This effect will tend to shorten the generation interval when compared 
to earlier stages of the epidemic when no countermeasures were in place ​(Bi et al. 2020b)​. ​Thus, the 
isolation policy affects the growth rate of the epidemic by the combination of two different effects.  
 
When estimating the effectiveness of an intervention, it is commonly used to look at effective 
reproduction number (R​t​), as it can be derived from the number of cases by various methods. 
However, most methods for estimating R​t​ assume that the generation interval stays constant even 
though there is good evidence against this assumption ​(Cori et al. 2013; Jacco Wallinga and Teunis 
2004)​. Hence, these estimations of the effective reproduction number don’t address the ‘physical’ 
meaning of R​t​: the number of infections an infectious person makes on average, but an ‘operational’ 
meaning: the reproduction number derived from the instantaneous growth rate, assuming constant 
generation interval. The actual average number of infections an infected person makes (the ‘physical’ 
R​t​) is generally lower than the ‘operational’ R​t​. Operational R​t​ values may be useful for predicting the 
trajectory of the epidemic so long as predictions are made via the same model used to infer R​t​. Still 
care should be taken in interpreting the meaning of these non-physical R​t​ values. 
  
What can we learn from the household secondary attack rate? 
The secondary attack rate is defined as the fraction of contacts who become infected. The set of 
people contacted by an infectious individual can be divided into various categories, for example 
household contacts and external contacts outside the household. Making such a distinction is useful 
for several reasons. First, identifying household contacts is relatively easy, which makes determining 
the secondary attack rate within the household much simpler than determining the overall secondary 
attack rate. Second, many non-pharmaceutical interventions such as mask usage, physical 
distancing, or lockdown affect household contacts differently from non household contacts. For 
example, most people do not wear masks at home.  Thus, knowing the household attack rate can 
provide important data for predicting the efficiency of non-pharmaceutical interventions.  
 
Let’s consider a household with four individuals, one of whom is infectious. Our best estimate for the 
household secondary attack rate is ≈15%. This means that if we assume most infections in a 
household are secondary (meaning that a person was infected outside the household and now 
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infects a totally susceptible household) the infectious household member will infect about 0.5 others 
on average. Assuming non-pharmaceutical interventions do not impact the behavior of people inside 
their homes significantly and assuming a significant fraction of new infections occur in households 
with no past infections, this kind of estimate can be used to produce a lower bound on the effective 
reproduction number (R​t​). Indeed in many places where lockdown was enforced, the effective 
reproduction number did not decrease much below 0.5. This calculation also implies that in countries 
with R​t​ close to 1, a large portion of infections occur at home ​(Gudbjartsson et al. 2020)​. Further 
measures such as the isolation of infectious individuals outside their homes could potentially bring R​t 
below this figure, as was achieved in several places in China. In addition, this calculation makes clear 
that R​t​ during lockdown could be significantly influenced by the size of a representative household, 
which varies by a factor of ≈3 between countries ​(Bradbury et al. 2014)​. The household reproductive 
number would decrease throughout the progression of the epidemic as the pool of susceptible 
people within a household is depleted. For example, in a household of 4 people, if one person is 
infected he/she can infect 3 other people. Once one of those people gets infected, they now have only 
2 other potential people to infect. 
 
What are compartmental models and what assumptions do they make?  
Compartmental models are one of the most prominent tools used to study the pandemic and 
forecast its progression. As the name suggests, these models divide the population into distinct 
compartments which represent different states of infection. The most commonly-used 
compartments are: the susceptible compartment (S), containing people who are susceptible to 
infection but not yet infected; the infectious compartment (I), which includes infected individuals who 
are contagious; and the recovered compartment (R), which includes people who were infected but are 
no longer infectious or susceptible, either because they are no longer shedding the virus in high 
quantities  or because they died. These compartments describe the “SIR” model. It is common to 
supplement these compartments with an additional compartment called “E” for “exposed” individuals, 
who are not yet infectious. Models with this extra compartment are called SEIR models. An important 
distinction is that the infectious period (which is on the order of 4 days for half maximum infectivity) 
is much shorter than the overall duration of illness (on the order of a few weeks), as people's illness is 
usually prolonged due to the inflammatory response of the immune system. People usually stop 
being strongly contagious well before they recover from the disease.  
 
In SIR and SEIR models, individuals flow through the compartments in a linear fashion - from 
susceptible (S), to exposed (E), to infected (I), to recovered (R). People are assumed to move between 
model compartments at a rate proportional to the number of individuals in the compartment. For 
example, people move from the infectious compartment into the recovered compartment at a 
constant rate, usually noted as 𝛾, which is set as the inverse of the average infectious period. In the 
same manner, people move from the exposed compartment into the infectious compartment at a 
constant rate denoted 𝜎, which is set as the inverse of the average latent period. Using such models, 
however implicitly assumes a specific type of distribution for the latent and infectious periods.  
 
SIR and SEIR models inherently assume that the distribution of latent and infectious periods is 
exponential, as this is the only distribution for which the probability to transition to the next 
compartment is constant and independent of the time spent in the current one. An exponential 
distribution, however, implies that most people spend a very short time in the exposed or infectious 
states, which is not consistent with the inference from documented pairs of infector and infectee that 
people are typically contagious for ≈4-5 days ​(He et al. 2020)​. Thus, some extended models employ a 
“trick” to make the distributions more realistic. This trick involves splitting up the exposed and 
infectious compartments into N sub-compartments each, and multiplying the rate at which people 
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move between those sub-compartments by the N. This way, the sum of people in the exposed 
sub-compartment represents all the exposed people, and the same holds true for the infectious 
compartment. Now, however, the time spent in the exposed or infectious compartments will be 
distributed as a sum of N exponentials, which is called the Erlang distribution. This distribution is 
similar in shape to the distributions observed when studying infector-infectee pairs. 
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